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The A. Q. Khan nuclear supplier network constitutes the most severe loss of 
control over nuclear technology ever.  For the first time in history all of the keys to a 
nuclear weapon—the supplier networks, the material, the enrichment technology, and the 
warhead designs—were outside of state oversight and control.  This thesis demonstrates 
that Khan’s nuclear enterprise evolved out of a portion of the Pakistani procurement 
network of the 1970s and 1980s.  It presents new information on how the Pakistani state 
organized, managed, and oversaw its nuclear weapons laboratories. This thesis provides 
extensive documentation of command and control challenges faced by Pakistan and 
argues that Khan was largely a rogue actor outside of state oversight.  The A. Q. Khan 
affair refutes more optimistic theories about the effects of nuclear proliferation.  This case 
study indicates that states have a difficult time balancing an abstract notion of safety 
against pressing needs for organizational speed and flexibility.  This thesis enumerates 
enabling institutional factors in Pakistan, which allowed Khan’s enterprise to continue 
and flourish, and which might also be generalizable to other states of proliferation 
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The A. Q. Khan nuclear supplier network constitutes the most severe loss of 
control over nuclear technology ever.  For the first time in history all of the keys to a 
nuclear weapon—the supplier networks, the material, the enrichment technology, and the 
warhead designs—were out of state oversight and control.  This thesis examines how 
Pakistan’s nuclear safety and security measures failed to prevent the transfer of secret 
nuclear technology.  It places this command and control breakdown in the larger context 
of Pakistan’s nuclear history and the diffusion of nuclear technology and expertise more 
generally.  It examines the implications of this episode for how we think about new 
nuclear states and the dangers of nuclear proliferation.   
A. Q. Khan was largely a free actor, conducting nuclear commerce without 
authorization of the Pakistani state.  This thesis provides evidence, where it exists, of 
possible Pakistani state knowledge or consent for Khan’s nuclear enterprise.  However, 
there is no proof that the Pakistani state was aware of the nuclear transfers from Pakistan 
to Iran, North Korea, Libya, and perhaps others.  The dangers to Pakistan were too great, 
the benefits too small.  Instead, the most easily identifiable beneficiary was Khan, and the 
individuals that work with him, as evidenced in bank accounts in Pakistan, Dubai, 
Switzerland, and elsewhere.   
Khan’s ability to forge a non-state network to transfer closely held nuclear secrets 
to pariah regimes is disturbing on multiple levels.  First, Khan’s activities call into 
question the ability of Pakistan to safeguard and secure its nuclear arsenal.  More 
generally, how well can new nuclear states gauge the internal and external threats to their 
new arsenals?  Previous arguments that new nuclear states could control their precious 
nuclear assets—precisely because they were precious—may have been overly optimistic.  
Second, Khan’s continued operation for decades, first as an importer of nuclear 
technology and subsequently as an exporter, reveal weaknesses in the ability of the 
international community to identify and halt illicit nuclear commerce.  The ability of the 
same individuals in Europe to operate with impunity is a costly embarrassment to 
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Western governments.  Finally, Khan’s network may reveal a more general loss of 
control over nuclear technology that will be difficult to reverse.  Nuclear components are 
in the hands of many states.  They were transferred through many middlemen.  They 
were manufactured in factories from Libya to South Africa to Malaysia.  Nuclear 
weapons designs were copied and transferred haphazardly.  The barriers to entry into the 
nuclear world have been high.  If they are lowering, we ought to be worried.  
Understanding Khan’s nuclear commerce—and policy responses to it—are crucial to 
ensure that we all do better.   
B. BACKGROUND 
In many ways, Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons was exceptional. N. M. 
Butt, a retired Pakistani nuclear physicist, recounts that the nuclear development took 
place in “an ocean of ignorance” in a country that possessed “lame high technology.”1  A. 
Q. Khan, the Pakistani metallurgist who played a pivotal role in Pakistan’s uranium 
enrichment program, boasted, “A country, which could not make sewing needles, good 
bicycles or even ordinary durable metalled roads was embarking on one of the latest and 
most difficult technologies.”2  
Pakistan’s commitment to its nuclear course was steadfast despite a tumultuous 
political scene: in which one civilian prime minister was executed by the military, in 
which one military dictator died under mysterious circumstances, and in which civilian 
governments are frequently deposed by presidential or military intervention.   Western 
audiences view Pakistan’s domestic politics with understandable concern.  Radical 
religious parties hold or share power in two of Pakistan’s four provinces.  There are 
regular bombings, terrorist attacks, and sectarian feuds.   In December 2003, President 
Pervez Musharraf narrowly survived two assassination attempts in a two-week period.3   
                                                 
1 N. M. Butt, “Nuclear Developments in Pakistan,” in Arms Race and Nuclear Developments in South 
Asia, ed. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Imtiaz H. Bokhari (Islamabad, Pak.: Islamabad Policy Research 
Institute, 2004), 44. 
2 Peter Edidin, “Pakistan’s Hero: Dr. Khan Got What He Wanted, and He Explains How,” New York 
Times, February 15, 2004. 
3 Salman Masood, “Pakistani Leader Escapes Attempt at Assassination,” New York Times, December 
26, 2003; “President Sees Extremists Behind Blast,” The News International (Islamabad), December 14, 
2003, http://jang.com.pk/thenews/dec2003-daily/15-12-2003/main/main4.htm.   
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Hand in hand with internal challenges, Pakistan also lives in a dangerous 
neighborhood. To its east, it shares a 2,000-kilometer border with a nuclear-armed India 
that has population, economic, and military advantages, and with which it has fought 
three or four wars, depending on who is counting.  To its west is Iran, which harbors 
nuclear ambitions, and with which Pakistan has a less than cordial relationship.  To the 
north is a literal war zone after two decades of a Pakistani policy to cultivate “strategic 
space” in Afghanistan collapsed on September 11, 2001.  It has an unsteady alliance with 
the world’s remaining superpower, which already has pre-empted one Muslim country 
with nuclear aspirations. 
Complicating matters further, Pakistan continues to weather an international 
imbroglio concerning the sale of nuclear weapons technology to other states.  It appears 
that from 1987 to 2003, A. Q. Khan, head of one of Pakistan’s key nuclear organizations, 
was overseeing a nuclear supply network, which sold or attempted to sell to Iran, Iraq, 
North Korea, Libya, and perhaps others.4   
Pakistan’s rocky domestic landscape, precarious security environment, and the  
A. Q. Khan scandal have led many to seriously question Pakistan’s capability and will to 
safeguard its nuclear arsenal.  Jim Hoagland, Pulitzer-winning columnist for the 
Washington Post, was unabashed in expressing his concerns: “Pakistan continues to be 
the most dangerous place on Earth because of its mix of nuclear weapons, unstable 
politics, religious fanaticism and the involvement of senior military and intelligence 
officials in terrorist networks, including al Qaeda and the Taliban.”5  Leonard Weiss, 
former staff director of the Senate Committee on Government Affairs, was equally blunt: 
“Pakistan lied, stole, and conned its way to becoming a nuclear weapons power.  Now it's 
doing the same as a nuclear broker.”6 
The controversy about Pakistan’s character, institutions, and intentions fits in a 
broader academic debate about nuclear proliferation. The discussion has organized into 
                                                 
4 See David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Unraveling the A. Q. Khan and Future Proliferation 
Networks," The Washington Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2005): 111-128; and Christopher Clary, “Dr. Khan’s 
Nuclear Walmart,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 76 (March-April 2004): 31-6.   
5 Jim Hoagland, “Nuclear Resolution,” Washington Post, January 8, 2004. 
6 Leonard Weiss, “Pakistan: It’s déjà vu all over again,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 60, no. 3 
(May/June 2004), 52.   
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an argument between those who think that the spread of nuclear weapons may be a 
positive development for international stability and those who believe that proliferation 
will have a deleterious impact.  These contending camps are often labeled deterrence 
optimists and proliferation pessimists.  As Peter R. Lavoy noted in his survey of this 
literature, “Debate over the strategic consequences of the spread of nuclear weapons is 
more than an academic exercise.  It affects the price officials should be willing to pay for 
nonproliferation.  This in turn influences the number and identity of states which might 
some day acquire nuclear weapons.”7 
The academic debate has been theory-driven.  Lavoy laments, “No thorough 
effort is made to test the power of either theory against the observed conduct of the actual 
leaders and organizations responsible for managing the nuclear forces of new nuclear 
states.”8  This is unfortunate, for the optimism-pessimism debate can be tested.  Peter D. 
Feaver has noted that while a good theory does not have to explain everything, we lose 
confidence in a theory if it consistently fails to predict the “observable implications” of 
its logic.9  For better or worse, Khan’s prolific nuclear dealings provide extensive 
opportunities to test such arguments. 
C. THE OPTIMISM-PESSIMISM DEBATE 
The entirety of the nuclear age has been dominated by debates about whether 
these destructive weapons are a force of stability or a source of danger.  These earlier 
nuclear debates were disproportionately focused on the relationship between established 
nuclear powers, though they had clear implications for the proliferation of nuclear 
explosive technology.  This section draws out these implications. It concludes by arguing  
that we are now in the midst of a new nuclear debate.  Today, the primary focus is, and 
ought to be, about the ability of new nuclear states to adequately safeguard and secure 
their nuclear deterrents.     
                                                 
7 Peter R. Lavoy, “The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: A Review Essay,” Strategic 
Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 696.  Kenneth N. Waltz devalues the impact of U.S. policy: “Why should 
we think that if we relax, numerous states will begin to make nuclear weapons?”  Waltz, “More May Be 
Better,” in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 42. 
8 Ibid., 698. 
9 Peter D. Feaver, “Optimists, Pessimists, and Theories of Nuclear Proliferation Management,” 
Strategic Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 766.  Feaver borrows the “observable implications” concept from 
Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 29-30. 
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Within weeks of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Jacob Viner 
argued that the destructive impact of nuclear weapons would deter even potentially 
victorious states from attacking a nuclear-armed adversary.  As a consequence, the spread 
of such weapons might deter conflict and be a force of stability in international politics.10  
Several commentators either extended or independently developed Viner’s argument.11  
Kenneth N. Waltz presented the model argument for this optimistic view of nuclear 
weapons.  Even a few nuclear warheads could deliver devastating damage on any target 
against which they were employed. An adversary’s nuclear force is likely to be relatively 
invulnerable to a disarming strike, even a strike using nuclear forces.  The mere 
possibility that such a deterrent force would survive and be used by a defender would 
outweigh any potential gains an attacker might seek.12  Waltz and other deterrence 
optimists emphasized the clarity that nuclear weapons generate in cost-benefit 
calculations for any rational actor, anywhere.   
Other commentators had a narrower focus.  Some advocated permitting or 
facilitating the acquisition of nuclear weapons by U.S. allies to dispel any confusion 
about the U.S. ability to honor its extended deterrence guarantees.13  More recently, using 
similar logic, some regional analysts began to muse that the introduction of nuclear 
weapons into conflict-ridden regions might stabilize them.14 
The deterrence optimists’ lack of concern about proliferation is intimately tied up 
with their faith that deterrence is almost automatic once a state achieves a survivable 
second strike.  They argue that for any state with the technical capabilities to acquire and 
maintain nuclear weapons, creating such a second-strike force will be possible.  In the 
United States competition with the Soviet Union, however, this relaxed view was not 
held by a majority of nuclear policymakers or analysts.  Deterrence was viewed as 
                                                 
10 Jacob Viner subsequently published an article based on comments he made at a seminar at the 
University of Chicago in 1945.  See “The Implications of the Atomic Bomb for International Relations,” 
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 90 (January 1946) quoted in Lavoy, “Strategic 
Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation,” 700-1. 
11 For a fuller discussion, see Lavoy, “Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation,” 700-7.   
12 Waltz, “More May Be Better,” in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. 
13 This was most visible in the Multilateral Force debate.  See Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of 
Nuclear Strategy, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 309-14. 
14 See Lavoy, “Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation,” 706-7, fns. 39-42, and 715, fn. 68. 
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somewhat fragile, and new nuclear states complicated this already difficult superpower 
competition.  Each new nuclear state complicated the picture more—and analysts labeled 
this “the Nth country problem.”15  Additionally, each Nth state set the stage for an N+1 
country, which would complicate the deterrence calculations further.16  If new nuclear 
entrants could be kept at bay—perhaps through a legally binding nuclear nonproliferation 
treaty—strategists could focus on stabilizing the U.S.-Soviet competition. 
As Bradley Thayer has noted, the nuclear debate in the United States passed 
through three stages.17  Initially, it focused on the vulnerability of nuclear forces to 
counterforce strike.  This debate dominated the theoretical literature—and was reflected 
in U.S. nuclear force structure—from roughly 1960 to 1980.18  In the last decade of the 
Cold War, the “second debate on nuclear stability” focused increasing attention to the 
susceptibility of the United States command and control system to a decapitation strike.19  
Finally, after the Cold War had largely concluded, the third wave of research concluded 
that the solutions the United States and the Soviet Union had put into place to solve 
counterforce and countercontrol vulnerabilities had significantly increased the risks of 
nuclear accidents and inadvertence.20 
To put it another way, for nuclear deterrence to generate stability, an adversary 
must believe that its opponent will retain a second strike capability that can inflict 
                                                 
15 Oscar Morgenstern, “The N-Country Problem,” Fortune (March 1961): 136; Fred C. Iklé, “Nth 
Countries and Disarmament,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 16 (1960): 391-94; Paul Doty, “The Role of 
the Smaller Powers,” Daedalus 89 (1960): 818-30. 
16 Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 288. 
17 Bradley Thayer, “The Risk of Nuclear Inadvertence: A Review Essay,” Security Studies 3, no. 3 
(Spring 1994). 
18 The representative early work of this debate was Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of 
Terror,” Foreign Affairs 37, no. 2 (January 1959): 211-34. 
19 While Herman Kahn had noted the risks of a “splendid first strike” as early as 1960, he had judged 
the risks to be relatively minor.  Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1961), 36-37.  Early works expressing concern about countercontrol strikes include Gary D. Brewer 
and Paul Bracken, “Some Missing Pieces of the C3I Puzzle,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 28, no. 3 
(September 1978): 451-469; John D. Steinbruner, “Nuclear Decapitation,” Foreign Policy, no. 45 (Winter 
1981–1982): 16-28; and Jonathan B. Tucker, “Strategic Command-and-Control Vulnerabilities: Dangers 
and Remedies,” Orbis 26, no. 4 (Winter 1983): 941-63. 
20 Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1993); Peter 
Douglas Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, 
Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
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unacceptable damage even after a first strike is launched.  Secondly, a nuclear weapons 
state must believe that it will not be able to limit damage to itself by launching a 
decapitating countercontrol first strike.  (The converse of these first two conditions is also 
important: if a state believes it is susceptible to a disarming or decapitating strike, it may 
respond with a dangerous nuclear “hair trigger” posture.)21  Finally, nuclear deterrence is 
only stable if the risks of nuclear inadvertence and accidents—and as a consequence 
accidental nuclear war—are low. 
The literature of the “third” nuclear debate focused on accidents and inadvertence.  
Dominated by Bruce G. Blair, Peter D. Feaver, and Scott D. Sagan, it reframed the 
command and control issue away from rational deterrence theory and towards 
organization theory.  Rational deterrence theory—a natural outgrowth of structural realist 
expectations of state behavior—argues that the chance of nuclear retaliation will 
moderate state conflict and prevent nuclear war.  Nuclear war is devastatingly irrational 
and, hence, will not occur.  As Feaver has noted, rational deterrence theory viewed 
nuclear operations as epiphenomenal—nuclear operations will flow naturally and 
completely from the rationality of the nuclear weapons states.22  In Kenneth N. Waltz’s 
famous phrase, “We do not have to wonder whether they will take good care of their 
weapons.  They have every incentive to do so.”23 
However, in the early 1990s, the “proliferation pessimists” argued that nuclear 
weapons states would have “bounded rationality.”24  There were inherent limitations to 
the ability of organizations to learn, and these limitations were possibly more pronounced 
in the military commands entrusted with nuclear weapons stewardship.  They induced 
from their understanding of U.S. near-failures during the Cold War that nuclear weapons 
are significantly less likely to produce strategic stability than rational deterrence theory 
                                                 
21 Peter D. Feaver, “Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations,” International Security 17, 
no. 3 (Winter 1992-1993): 165.  Feaver was referring solely to fears of a countercontrol strike, but a 
counterforce threat would also generate the same reaction.  Such fears over a potential counterforce strike 
are precisely what motivated Wohlstetter to write, “Delicate Balance of Terror.” 
22 Feaver, “The Politics of Inadvertence,” Security Studies 3, no. 3 (Spring 1994): 501. 
23 Waltz, “More May Be Better,” in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 21. 
24 Scott D. Sagan, “More Will Be Worse,” in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 51. 
8 
would indicate.  These problems would be at least equally pronounced and likely greater 
in new nuclear states.  As Thayer has summarized: 
First, the emerging nuclear states will have the same trouble the 
superpowers had in building safe forces: the United States continued to 
have many accidents long after it had built a sophisticated force.  Second, 
the nuclear forces of emerging nuclear states will be less safe than the 
forces of superpowers: new nuclear states will not be able to afford 
modern safety and warning systems, and therefore will be more prone to 
false warning and nuclear accidents.  Also, emerging nuclear states have 
militaries that are more powerful relative to civilian authorities than is the 
case in the United States and have more turbulent civil-military relations.  
This will inhibit organizational learning because the incentives to protect 
the military will be valued over the accurate processing of information.  
Third, emerging nuclear states will face immediate security threats which 
will necessitate keeping the arsenal on a high state of alert.  The tight 
coupling of the command and control system with the nuclear forces of the 
state will make the arsenal susceptible to accidents.25 
Feaver has framed the debate over appropriate command and control in terms of 
two principal dilemmas: (1) What is the proper mix of positive and negative controls?  (2) 
What is the proper degree of assertive or delegative control for central authorities to 
exercise?26  Positive control is the ability to launch a nuclear weapon when demanded.  
Negative control is the ability to prevent weapons from being launched when they are not 
commanded to be.  The tension between positive and negative control is reflected in 
Feaver’s always/never problem: “Leaders want a high assurance that the weapons will 
always work when directed and a similar assurance the weapons will never be used in the 
absence of authorized direction.”27  
The mix of positive and negative controls chosen directly impacts the degree to 
which central authorities (in Feaver’s case, civilian leaders) assert control over the 
nuclear arsenal or delegate that control to military authorities.  The more assertive control 
that the leadership exercises, the higher the chances are that a decapitation strike will be 
successful.  In other words, higher assertive control carries with it the possibility that 
nuclear command and control will “fail-impotent,” or, more pleasantly, “fail-safe.”  The 
                                                 
25 Thayer, “The Risk of Nuclear Inadvertence,” 470. 
26 See Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, chap. 1. 
27 Feaver, “Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations.”  
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greater delegative control that is given to the military commanders, the higher the risk of 
accidental, unauthorized, or third-party use.  The system can “fail-deadly.” 
In 1997, this critique of deterrence optimism faced its own critique from a new 
generation of “neo-optimists.”28  Implicitly, they accepted that the manner in which 
nuclear operations are executed—the minutiae that were largely irrelevant to earlier 
optimists—mattered in assessing stability.29  But, they turned the proliferation pessimists’ 
argument on its head: “Just as minor states have disadvantages that make duplication of 
advanced methods of negative command and control difficult, they also have certain 
advantages that enable them to employ different, but comparable methods of negative 
command and control.”30   
New nuclear states are primarily concerned with regional adversaries and, as a 
consequence, they can capture two advantages that were denied to the superpowers, 
precisely because of the stunning military capabilities that the Cold War enemies had.  
First, these “minor proliferators” will have arsenals that are smaller and simpler than the 
United States and Soviet Union possessed.  This significantly reduces the scale of the 
command and control problem.  Secondly, their forces can be protected from 
counterforce strikes through simple methods of concealment.31  A necessary corollary to 
this is that they are protected from countercontrol attacks if individuals in control of the 
dispersed, concealed arsenal have been de facto predelegated to launch in the event of a 
decapitation strike.32 
This outline of the optimism-pessimism debate allows us to extrapolate to specific 
predictions of how new nuclear states are likely to arrange their command and control 
systems.  Pessimists fear that new nuclear states will create nuclear forces that are 
                                                 
28 Jordan Seng, “Less is More: Command and Control Advantages of Minor Nuclear States,” Security 
Studies 6, no. 4 (Summer 1997): 50-92; David J. Karl, “Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear 
Powers,” International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996–1997): 87-119.  Thayer, “The Risk of Nuclear 
Inadvertence,” foreshadows several “neo-optimist” arguments. 
29 Feaver notes this in his critique of neo-optimism. “Neo-optimists and the Enduring Problem of 
Nuclear Proliferation,” Security Studies 6, no. 4 (Summer 1997): 93-125. 
30 Seng, “Less is More,” 62 
31 Ibid., 63. 
32 Seng never seriously deals with the countercontrol problem.  Operational flexibility, while 
somewhat mitigating the countercontrol problem, does not eliminate it. Seng, “Less is More,” 75. 
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susceptible to counterforce or countercontrol strikes.33  As a consequence, they worry that 
such nuclear newcomers will be forced to place nuclear forces on a high state of alert.  
Given poor early warning and command and control technology, these new nuclear states 
are likely to encounter grave dangers from such a “tight coupling” between the system’s 
stimulus and response.34  Because of the significant command and control challenges, 
pessimists believe that nuclear decisions may be predelegated to lower level 
commanders, raising the risk of accidental nuclear war if one of those commanders 
determines the conditions of his predelegated authority have arisen or from the “crazy 
colonel” problem.35  Finally, pessimists worry about safety and security issues.  They are 
concerned that the relative ignorance of new nuclear states increases the chance for 
nuclear accidents, particularly during crisis and conflict.36  Further, they worry that the 
domestic instability of new nuclear states may weaken controls the government has over 
its nuclear arsenal.37 
Optimists, on the other hand, predict that relatively simple concealment and 
mobility measures can ensure the survivability of new nuclear arsenals.38  Because such 
arsenals can ride-out an adversarial first strike, they will not face the lose-them-or-use-
them situations that led the superpowers to launch-on-warning postures during the Cold 
War.  Further, they would not have the necessary early warning or command and control 
capabilities to launch-on-warning even if they did so desire.39  The smaller size of the 
arsenal will decrease, ceteris parabis, the chance of accidents compared to the huge 
arsenals of the superpowers.40  This smaller size and lower sophistication is also likely to 
                                                 
33 Sagan, “More Will Be Worse,” 64-5. 
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40 Seng, “Less is More,” 70. 
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dampen the “tight coupling” that might lead to dangerously rapid action-reaction cycles.41  
Additionally, the smaller size will mean less individuals will have to guard the arsenals, 
and that those individuals can be more closely screened.  Ensuring the loyalty of the 
nuclear guardians will be further helped by more relaxed views of domestic espionage 
likely to be held in new nuclear weapons states.42 
The pessimists appear to be worried about the wrong thing.  Their concerns about 
command and control in new nuclear weapons states were principally based on their 
concerns about command and control during the U.S.-Soviet confrontation.  The dangers 
of a launch-on-warning posture for South Asia are presently non-existent because neither 
Pakistan nor its principal adversary, India, have developed such a posture.  Both states 
have undeniably increased readiness levels since the 1998 nuclear tests, but not nearly to 
the extent predicted by the most pessimistic observers.  The optimists were correct that 
new nuclear states would be able to develop survivable basing modes.  It would be nearly 
impossible for India to eliminate all of Pakistan’s mobile missile platforms in any 
prospective first strike.  However, the mobility “solution” to the survivability “problem” 
significantly compounds the command and control challenge, something the optimists do 
not fully acknowledge. 
This thesis explores one portion of the optimism-pessimism debate: that relating 
to the ability of new nuclear states to secure their nuclear arsenals from insider threats.  
The academic debate has not ignored the challenges posed by bad actors.  Herbert L. 
Abrams has examined the dangers posed by mentally unstable individuals with access to 
nuclear weapons.43  Jessica Stern and Gregory Koblentz have observed the potential 
tension between measures designed to improve stability between states and measures 
designed to secure weapons from insider threats.44  This stability-security tradeoff is a 
reflection of Feaver’s broader always-never dilemma.  Scott D. Sagan has described 
                                                 
41 Karl, “Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers,” 112-3; Seng “Less is More,” 74-77. 
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“how efforts to improve nuclear security can inadvertently backfire, increasing the risks 
they are designed to reduce.”45  For instance, by increasing the number of guards at a 
nuclear facility, there are more opportunities for a terrorist to become a guard. 
The A. Q. Khan affair provides a particularly significant case study of an insider 
threat.  The optimist argument recognized that state institutions in new nuclear states 
were likely to have greater relative power over a normal individual.  Authoritarian or 
semi-authoritarian regimes would be able to exert greater control over individuals that 
had access to nuclear secrets, they argued, in part because these regimes could dispense 
with niceties like due process and civil liberties.46  While this insight is correct, the Khan 
episode indicates that senior officials may have greater autonomy in authoritarian or 
semi-authoritarian regimes.  Institutional checks-and-balances may not function, 
particularly in the context of secret and sensitive national security issues.   
As will be discussed in greater detail below, the extent of state authorization of  
A. Q. Khan’s nuclear dealings is debatable.  The available evidence seems to indicate that 
Khan was largely a rogue actor, acting without the approval of the state writ large.  State 
knowledge and authorization is not a binary issue, however.  The available evidence is 
scant and ambiguous.  This thesis will necessarily be forced to resort to educated 
conjecture at points.  Nevertheless, there does appear to be evidence that key Pakistani 
officials may have been predisposed to authorize limited nuclear cooperation with Iran in 
the late 1980s.  Further, nuclear transactions with North Korea may not have been 
strongly opposed in the context of a much broader strategic relationship between 
Islamabad and Pyongyang—even if such transactions were not explicitly authorized by 
the state.  However, it is Khan’s nuclear dealings with Libya that indicate the highest 
degree of nuclear free-lancing.  The benefits to the Pakistani state are unclear, while the 
benefits to Khan as an individual are obvious.   
This set of facts leads us toward the pessimist’s camp for three reasons—and it 
leads us to the pessimists’ camp even when we consider multiple interpretations of the 
Khan episode.  First, if there was state knowledge of Khan’s nuclear dealings, 
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46 See fn. 42. 
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assumptions of state rationality by Waltz and Seng may not be as binding as the optimists 
had hoped.  The Pakistani state, if it were aware of Khan, would have held a remarkably 
narrow view of Pakistan’s national interest.  A rational nuclear weapons state does not 
offer to transfer nuclear technology to likely adversaries (Iran) or the adversaries of key 
allies (Iran and Iraq) or to countries of marginal importance (Libya).  Such behavior is 
certain to draw the ire of friend and foe alike.  The transfer of nuclear technology to 
Tehran, in particular, has significantly complicated Pakistan’s regional security picture.  
This scenario ought to be troubling for optimists, because under it, Pakistan would not 
have appeared to take particularly good care of their nuclear technology, despite having 
every incentive to do so.   
If the state did not know or authorize Khan’s nuclear moonlighting, this also 
reinforces the pessimist argument.  Realist assumptions of state rationality are rendered 
moot because of the key role of the non-state actor.  The ability and willingness of the 
Pakistani state to safeguard and secure its nuclear technology are called into deep 
question.  By implication, the ability and willingness of other new nuclear states is also 
challenged.   
Finally, under either scenario, the optimist argument is indirectly challenged.  
Such nuclear transfers have the potential to significantly ease the path of nuclear 
aspirants to an explosive device.  A key plank of the optimist argument is that the 
difficulty of acquiring a nuclear device will sort out the most chaotic and unreliable 
states.  In other words, the ability to adequately secure nuclear technology was viewed by 
optimists as only a moderately challenging task.  The far more challenging task of 
acquiring a nuclear arsenal would screen out those technologically and organizationally 
deficient states.  To the extent that proliferation supplier networks ease the path to a 
nuclear arsenal—an open question for sure—the screening mechanism is weakened. 
Waltz has argued that even this weaker threshold will not qualitatively change the 
situation: “Although some of the new nuclear states may be economically and technically 
backward, they will either have expert and highly trained scientists and engineers or they 
will not be able to produce nuclear weapons.  Even if they buy or steal the weapons, they 
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will have to hire technicians to maintain and control them.”47  Waltz is stretching, 
however.  Competent technicians and scientists are readily available—witness the 
number of competent members of the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo.  The difficulties of 
manufacturing a nuclear explosive device are not the personnel with knowledge, but the 
huge engineering and industrial challenge of creating fissile material.  To the extent the 
challenges of that task are lessened, less capable, less competent, and less stable states 
will be able to enter the nuclear business.   
Examining the A. Q. Khan affair also points to six different conditions that 
enabled or eased his illicit nuclear activities.  Many of these conditions could be 
replicated in other new nuclear states.     
1. The Norm of Norm Defiance  
New nuclear states are likely to have actively opposed or circumvented the 
nuclear nonproliferation regime for decades.  Though the process of norm creation is 
poorly understood, it seems likely that actively challenging a norm is likely to lead to the 
creation of counter-narratives among key actors in the acquiring state.  Internalizing 
nonproliferation logic would de-legitimize the nuclear enterprise for a nuclear aspirant.  
Evidence of such a counter-narrative can be found in Khan’s stated desire to pierce the 
“clouds of so-called secrecy” that the non-proliferation regime sought to create.48 India’s 
statement that its test was a blow “against nuclear apartheid” also captures this sentiment, 
even if Delhi’s actions did not attack the nuclear regime from as many directions as 
Khan’s subterranean nuclear dealings.49   
2. The Uranium Route 
There are two routes to the acquisition of fissile material necessary to develop 
nuclear weapons: uranium enrichment or plutonium production.  Plutonium production 
requires the acquisition of large-scale facilities: most importantly a nuclear reactor and a 
plutonium reprocessing plant.  These facilities can only be acquired from a few sources 
globally.  They are large, difficult to construct, and easy to observe.  There are a number 
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of ways to enrich uranium: gaseous diffusion, gas centrifuge, aerodynamic nozzle, 
chemical, laser, and electromagnetic.50  Pakistan was one of the first developing countries 
to employ gas centrifuge technology to enrich uranium.  This technology uses thousands 
of centrifuges spinning at extremely high speeds to separate uranium isotopes of different 
density.  The key point is that rather than the few large facilities of the plutonium route, a 
country pursuing gas centrifuge technology would need to acquire nearly a hundred 
components each for thousands of centrifuge.  Since a majority of these components 
cannot be easily manufactured, and because a majority of these components are 
proscribed by export control regimes, this necessitates a massive illicit procurement 
effort.  States that successfully develop gas centrifuge enrichment must develop a 
network to funnel cash, often through middlemen, to shady businessmen.  They then must 
transport the components from their point of origin, often relying on false end-user 
certificates and other techniques to deceive law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 
These goods are often transported through multiple third-party countries to further 
confuse watchful eyes before finally arriving in their destination.  All of these techniques 
to procure can be used to proliferate.  Further, bureaucrats and scientists involved with 
large, poorly documented cash transactions may quickly be corrupted by the process.  
When playing in mud, one gets dirty.  This problem is present in all illicit procurement, 
but seems to be particularly acute because of the logistical challenges of assembling a 
centrifuge cascade.   
3. Covert Weapons Programs 
Pakistan sought to acquire nuclear weapons by circumventing an increasingly 
elaborate global nonproliferation regime and in defiance of potential U.S. sanctions.  All 
the while Islamabad faced significant military threats from India, a neighbor that had 
already tested nuclear weapons, and perceived a potential military threat from 
extraregional actors, particularly Israel.  It was critical that the Pakistani nuclear program 
remain largely hidden from public scrutiny.  Throughout the 1980s, the existence of the 
Pakistani nuclear weapons program became a more open secret.  Nevertheless, the 
political classes in Islamabad and Rawalpindi could not publicly acknowledge a nuclear 
weapons infrastructure that their leadership denied existed.  Their ability to regulate this 
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program was significantly constrained during these most guarded years.  As Peter D. 
Feaver has noted, “Organizational theorists have long maintained that knowledge is 
power.  By restricting knowledge, power is also restricted.”51  This secrecy still imbues 
most aspects of the Pakistani program.  Even today, few military officers or civilian 
officials have a detailed understanding of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons infrastructure or its 
operational planning.  Even fewer are willing to question the procedures put in place to 
safeguard the nation’s nuclear secrets.  One imagines that nuclear decisions are also 
closely guarded in Tehran, Pyongyang, and perhaps other capitals, with similarly 
stultifying effects on potential regulators.   
4. Weak Institutions and Personalized Rule 
Power in Pakistan remains highly personalized.  Power is distributed unevenly 
between the prime minister, president, and chief of army staff.  The nuclear weapons 
program was initiated under President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in January 1972.  During his 
tenure, first as president and then as prime minister, the nuclear weapons program was 
under his direct control, through a few trusted aides in the military, foreign office, and 
strategic organizations.  Upon his ouster in 1977, Gen. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq attempted 
to institutionalize nuclear control.  He established a committee composed of select 
cabinet members, a military representative, and the heads of the strategic organizations 
themselves.  Even so, it appears this committee was a largely ad hoc body, with a rotating 
membership, few if any staff, and very circumscribed institutional memory.  The longest 
serving members on the committee appear to have been the heads of the Pakistan Atomic 
Energy Commission (PAEC) and Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), who had strong 
bureaucratic reasons to skew the institutional memory they shared with their counterparts.  
After Zia’s death in 1988, the military retained primary responsibility for the nuclear 
weapons program, selectively informing presidents and prime ministers about the 
program based on their perceived trustworthiness and the political alignment of the day.  
Within the military, more formal organizations were created to examine the details of 
nuclear development and operations.  After the May 1998 nuclear tests, it was possible to 
more openly discuss the nuclear weapons program.  Organizational growth followed the 
May tests, leading to the creation of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) in 1999 and the 
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announcement of a National Command Authority in 2000.  It was not until the creation of 
SPD in 1999 that a competent and persistent institution could encroach on the 
institutional autonomy of the PAEC and, to an even larger extent, KRL.  Complicating 
matters further, all of this was occurring in an environment of intense politicization.  An 
increase in civilian influence meant a loss of authority by the military.  An increase in 
responsibilities for PAEC was viewed in zero-sum terms by KRL.  Other new nuclear 
states are likely to have anarchic domestic political institutions, accompanied with intense 
bureaucratic rivalries.52   
5. A Weak Shadow of the Future 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Pakistani strategic planners worried about an 
existential threat from neighboring India.  Having lived through the vivisection of 
Pakistan in 1971, Pakistani elites may have focused on today’s threat rather than on 
potential future risks.  As noted previously, oversight institutions may not have had the 
institutional capacity to accurately judge risks and were overly reliant on the 
organizations they were supposed to regulate.  This only further weakened the shadow of 
the future, as the organizations had strong bureaucratic reasons to downplay the risk.  
Strategic organizations, particularly Khan Research Laboratories, were given greater 
autonomy and flexibility so that they could deploy a credible nuclear deterrent more 
quickly.       
6. The Limits of Vicarious Learning 
Sagan has extensively demonstrated the limitations that organizations face as they 
attempt to learn from past trial-and-errors.53  In a way, the Khan affair is a more 
challenging problem than imperfect learning.  Pakistani elites had to anticipate that a 
national hero would betray vital secrets for personal gain.  In order to prevent Khan’s 
nuclear dealings, they would have had to restrict significantly Khan’s autonomy over 
personnel, finances, logistics, and transport.  The ability of Pakistani strategic planners to 
learn from the experience of other nuclear states would have been constrained for three 
reasons: (1) the secrecy that surrounded nuclear operations, even in the United States, 
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until the mid-1980s; (2) the lack of institutional capability within Pakistani state 
structures to carry out such vicarious learning attempts; and (3) the poor analogy of 
outside experiences to the type of threat Khan would pose.  In other words, the mistakes 
others made were largely secret, Pakistan was not actively seeking to learn from those 
mistakes, and the mistakes Pakistan was about to make were quite unique!   
D. PREVIEW 
This thesis examines the interplay of these six conditions in the confusing, 
disturbing, and fascinating tale of A. Q. Khan. It places A. Q. Khan in the context of the 
Pakistani nuclear weapons procurement effort.  It examines three case studies in an 
attempt to understand different aspects of Khan’s proliferation enterprise.  Finally, it 
concludes with an examination of policy implications for the United States. 
1. From Illicit Procurement to Proliferation 
This chapter examines the overall Pakistani nuclear weapons effort, and A. Q. 
Khan’s role in it.  Khan returned to Pakistan from Europe in 1976.  He brought back 
knowledge of uranium enrichment technology and suppliers at an auspicious time for 
Khan and the Pakistani state.  The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission had undergone 
prolonged, multi-year negotiations for a plutonium reprocessing plant, and the Pakistani 
leadership was increasingly concerned with the ability of the PAEC to deliver.  Khan 
prodigiously set about creating a procurement system to gather nuclear-relevant 
components and materials from around the world in order to construct a scientific and 
engineering infrastructure that would provide fissile material for Pakistan and fame to 
Khan.  Further, Khan was able to operate with fewer bureaucratic constraints, because the 
Pakistani state was wary of hobbling Khan as it had with the PAEC.  This chapter 
highlights how Khan was able to establish a network for procurement that he would 
subsequently use for proliferation.  It also emphasizes how Khan’s institutional 
autonomy, gained in these early years, allowed him to avoid oversight and control during 
two decades of illicit nuclear deals. 
2. The First Time is Special: Khan’s Assistance to Iran 
Khan’s first nuclear sale appears to have been to Iran.  Chapter 2 discusses a 
unique constellation of actors within the Pakistani leadership who may have been 
predisposed to give Khan wide autonomy, particularly when it came to his dealings with 
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Iran.  It explores the scope and timeframe of Khan’s cooperation with Iran.  Finally, it 
assesses how significant Khan’s transfers were to Tehran’s broader nuclear effort. 
3. The Problem of Background Noise: Khan’s Assistance to North Korea 
This chapter summarizes the publicly available information about what was 
transferred to North Korea and how significant such transfers might be.  Many analysts 
assume that given Pakistani-North Korean cooperation on missile technology, any 
nuclear cooperation must have occurred with the knowledge of Pakistani state authorities.  
This chapter demonstrates that a nuclear-for-missile technology exchange, while 
possible, is not the only way to read the Pakistani-North Korean relationship.  It offers 
alternative, but unproven, explanations.  It examines the prospect that North Korea might 
have provided plutonium or plutonium expertise to Pakistan.  It looks at evidence 
suggesting Pakistan may have assisted North Korea with uranium conversion, suggesting 
broad state-to-state nuclear cooperation.  It concludes by arguing that none of the state-
level explanations are entirely compelling, and more weight should be given to individual 
or institutional rationales for Khan’s assistance to Pyongyang. 
4. Tragic Ambition: Libya and Nuclear Off-Shoring 
This chapter describes Khan’s growing network of friends, collaborators, and 
middlemen.  It discusses how Khan launched his most ambitious effort yet: his attempt to 
“off-shore” the production of key nuclear components to assist Libya.  Such an attempt 
would be a massive manufacturing and logistical challenge.  Firms from as far away as 
Turkey, South Africa, and Malaysia were involved in the effort.  The audacious plan 
opened up Khan’s network to penetration by foreign intelligence agencies, and prepared 
the way for Khan’s downfall. 
5. Conclusion 
This thesis concludes by discussing U.S. policy and intelligence failures in 
confronting the Khan network.  It examines the degree to which Khan was unique or 
representative of a growing pernicious threat.  Finally, it provides specific indicators to 
U.S. policymakers and analysts as they assess the risk that other nuclear procurement 
programs will have Khan-like entrepreneurs. 
20 
E. CONCLUSION 
Former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet has described Khan as 
being “at least as dangerous as Osama bin Laden.”54  Yet for almost two decades, Khan’s 
danger was hiding in plain sight.  Beginning in the early 1990s, reports were percolating 
through the U.S. intelligence community that Khan was assisting other countries with 
their nuclear programs.  Alarm bells should have been going off in Islamabad as Khan 
ventured to foreign capitals and amassed more wealth.  This thesis chronicles the story of 
one man’s remarkable ability to avoid getting caught, and lessons all of us should learn to 
prevent the recurrence of such a danger. 
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II. FROM ILLICIT PROCUREMENT TO PROLIFERATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Abdul Qadeer Khan’s proliferation network is a corrupted portion of a 
procurement system created by Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s.  Neighboring India 
significantly complicated Pakistan’s nuclear effort.  India’s 1974 “peaceful nuclear 
experiment,” where it detonated a nuclear explosive device at the Pokhran test site, 
alerted the world to the dangers of a free flow of nuclear information.  Led by the United 
States, the Western supplier cartels significantly strengthened the controls on the spread 
of key technologies.  At the same time, India’s test made Pakistan’s quest for the bomb 
even more desperate.   
This chapter highlights how Pakistan recovered from serious setbacks in its 
bomb-making enterprise, circumvented Western export controls, established a 
procurement system, and slowly developed an indigenous infrastructure to create an 
atomic bomb.  It introduces several themes that appear subsequently in this thesis.  It 
emphasizes how the same skills necessary to illicitly procure are used in illegal 
proliferation.  It discusses how even motivated Western bureaucracies were slow to 
respond to an increasingly visible threat.  Finally, it introduces a fierce rivalry between 
Khan’s organization and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission.   
In order to succeed, Pakistan felt that it was necessary to give Khan Research 
Laboratories greater autonomy and flexibility than was the bureaucratic norm.  Illicit 
procurement is a complicated and corrupting enterprise.  In the end, the flexibility 
essential for the success of Pakistan’s acquisition efforts also enabled Khan’s exports.  
This is the tragedy of the A. Q. Khan affair.  It also indicates that a state may value speed, 
secrecy, and success over more abstract concepts of safety and control. 
B. OUTRACING THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME 
Khan did not create the world marketplace for dual-use and proscribed goods, but 
he was the most successful individual ever to tap into it. Perhaps an Indian magazine was 
more correct than it could have known when in 1987 it described Khan as a cross 
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between Dr. Strangelove and “an Islamic James Bond.”55  Khan had been enmeshed in 
the European nuclear scene during the 1960s and 1970s.56  He studied briefly in Germany 
at West Berlin’s Technische Universität, received a master’s degree in metallurgical 
engineering at the Technische Hogeschool in Delft, the Netherlands, and received his 
doctorate in metallurgy from the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium.  His 
professors and fellow graduate students were a helpful resource to Khan throughout the 
1970s, though many of them cut off contact with Khan after formal government 
investigations were launched.  Some of his contacts, however, would continue to 
associate profitably with Khan until quite recently.   
From May 1972 to December 1975, Khan worked for Fysisch Dynamisch 
Onderzoekslaboratorium (FDO, or Physical Dynamic Research Laboratory), a subsidiary 
of Verenigde Machinefabrieken (VMF, or United Machine Factory).   FDO was a major 
subcontractor to Ultra-Centrifuge Nederland (UCN), which itself was the Almelo-based 
contractor to the Anglo-Dutch-German uranium enrichment consortium, URENCO.  
While at FDO, though only cleared to have access to “confidential” information, he 
regularly had access to materials of higher classification at FDO, UCN, and Fijn 
Mechanische Afdeling (FMA, or Fine Machine Department), another VMF subsidiary.  
In fact, he spent several days translating classified German reports on ultracentrifuge 
developments into Dutch.  He was permitted to take entire files home from work, so that 
his wife, a Dutch-speaking South African, could assist him in translations.  In at least one 
instance, he was observed writing notes in Urdu, which he explained away as a personal 
letter, unrelated to his work.   
By early fall 1975, however, the Dutch authorities had grown concerned about the 
number of suspicious incidents involving Khan.  He was removed from work on gas 
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centrifuge development in October and, shortly thereafter, went home to Pakistan on 
vacation.  He never returned to work, and resigned his position in March 1976.  Khan had 
been asked by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan’s prime minister, to stay in Pakistan and 
assist in the nuclear weapons effort.57  He brought with him stolen centrifuge designs and, 
perhaps more importantly, a list of dozens of companies that supplied centrifuge parts 
and materials.  After a brief stint within the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission 
structure, he moved to the Engineering Research Laboratories, setting up a uranium 
enrichment plant in Kahuta. Within four years of returning home, his progress was 
significant enough that then-President Zia ul-Haq renamed the facility.  Khan Research 
Laboratories (KRL) was born.   
As head of KRL, A. Q. Khan would report directly to the president.58  Initially, 
KRL would be in charge of one component of the larger nuclear puzzle: enriching 
gaseous uranium hexafluoride into weapons-grade material.  The rest of the process—
from mining to yellowcake to gasification and back again from gas to metal to milling 
and weapons fabrication—was under the control of the Pakistan Atomic Energy 
Commission.59   As will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, both 
organizations competed fiercely for resources.  As KRL pushed out, it inevitably bumped 
into PAEC’s area of responsibility, only raising the stakes of the bureaucratic infighting.  
Over time, KRL would gain a sanctioned role in developing delivery vehicles for the 
nuclear device as well as increasing (and possibly unsanctioned) involvement in the 
machining, fabrication, and assembly of a nuclear device. 
Almost immediately upon his return to Pakistan, Khan began to gather as many 
components and as much information as he could from the network he had established 
during his decades abroad.  He contacted former co-workers, inquiring about difficult 
                                                 
57 Malik, Dr. A. Q. Khan, 58-63; and “Unknown Facts about the Reprocessing Plant,” [Maulana 
Kausar Niazi, Aur Line Kat Gayee, trans. by Samuel Baid (Pak.: 1987), chapter 9,] in Pakistan’s Bomb, 
358-362. 
58 At this time, Gen. Zia-ul-Haq was also the Chief of Army Staff. 
59 Interview with Pakistani military official, June 2004; also see remarks by President Pervez 
Musharraf regarding Khan’s limited technical expertise outside of uranium enrichment.  David 
Brunnstrom, “Interview: Dirty Bomb a Fear, Not Nuclear Terrorism – Musharraf,” Reuters, April 14, 2005. 
24 
technical processes and urging them to visit Pakistan, where he could arrange for 
technical consulting.60  One FDO employee reportedly did travel to Pakistan in 1976.61   
Pakistani firms or embassy personnel contacted several Dutch firms about 
purchasing specialized components. Many of these goods were shipped to Pakistan, 
slipping through the porous export controls of several European countries.  Even as the 
Dutch government was investigating the A. Q. Khan affair, one Dutch company was 
manufacturing and shipping thousands of tubes made of a “special hard type of steel.” 
The frustration and impotence of the Dutch authorities is evident in the government 
report to the national legislature: “The great majority of it has been exported… despite 
repeated oral and written warnings not to do so.”62  Other Dutch firms sold more tubes to 
Pakistani firms.  Some were made out of aluminum.  More blatantly, a large order was 
made for high-carbon, low-corrosion martensitic steel, an alloy used almost exclusively 
for jet engines and gas centrifuges.   
This was part of a broader and clear Pakistani strategy.  Khan later said, “I took 
full advantage of the willingness of western companies to do business and decided to 
make purchases from the open market.”63  In Switzerland, Pakistan purchased key 
components for a uranium enrichment capability, including a massive unit to gasify and 
solidify uranium hexafluoride so they could be fed into the centrifuges, as well as high-
vacuum valves.  In Germany, Pakistani diplomats purchased vacuum pumps and gas 
purification equipment, along with rolled rods and thousands of specially welded 
aluminum parts.  In France, Pakistani buyers may have been able to buy bellows for 
ultracentrifuges by routing the shipment through Belgium and away from stricter French 
customs officials.  In Britain, Pakistan purchased high-frequency inverters through a 
British front company, sometimes using a West German commission agent.64   
Khan’s timing could hardly have been better.  When Zulfikar Ali Bhutto initiated 
the nuclear weapons program in 1972, he also appointed a new head for the Pakistan 
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Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC).  Dr. Munir Ahmad Khan had worked for the 
International Atomic Energy Agency on nuclear power projects since 1958—an 
association that would be used occasionally to question his support of the Pakistani 
nuclear weapons effort.  Munir Ahmad Khan’s PAEC initiated Pakistan down a 
plutonium route for nuclear weapons production.  But after India’s nuclear test in 1974, 
the international community took decisive action to ensure that Pakistan would not follow 
India’s lead.  Canada refused to supply nuclear fuel, heavy water, or spare parts for the 
continued operation of the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP).65  The Ford 
administration put intense pressure on Germany and France to stop cooperation with 
Pakistan, leading quickly to a Germany agreement to halt construction of a heavy-water 
production facility.  After initially delaying, France also abandoned an agreement to build 
a plutonium reprocessing facility for Pakistan in 1978. 
Many in the Pakistani government were angry and upset over the failure along the 
plutonium route.  They were angry with the international community, first and foremost.  
Pakistan was being punished for India’s sins.  Further, they argued that Canada’s refusal 
to supply KANUPP was a violation of its agreement with Pakistan, an agreement that had 
been validated by the International Atomic Energy Commission.  If Canada could defy its 
commitments to the agreement, Pakistanis argued, then Pakistan could ignore the 
safeguards to which it had agreed.  The line of analysis remained theoretical, since 
Pakistan was wary of the international response to such a course of action.  Finally, 
though, the Pakistani establishment was upset at PAEC for failing to succeed.  The 
negotiations had been interminable with France, and the price had been escalating 
constantly.  Bureaucrats at PAEC and in the Finance Ministry were blamed for dithering 
and nitpicking.  Next time, the lesson was learned, Pakistan must do it more quickly, 
before the window closes.   
The three body blows to the PAEC occurred at the same time that A. Q. Khan 
returned to Pakistan with his centrifuge designs and connections.  As Ashok Kapur has 
noted,  
                                                 
65 For a detailed description of the challenges this created, see Munir Ahmad Khan, “How Pakistan 
Made Nuclear Fuel,” parts 1 and 2, The Nation (Lahore), February 7 and 10, 1998, FBIS- 
FTS19980211000724 (posted February 11, 1998).   
26 
A. Q. Khan’s approach was innovative.  In the reprocessing route, 
Pakistan’s approach was to acquire a major facility, e. g. a reprocessing 
plant, and to deal with the major nuclear suppliers.  A. Q. Khan’s 
approach was entirely different—viz. to get bits and pieces (components) 
of enrichment technology and equipment from small, high technology 
Western firms who deal with individual components; to bring the 
components together so as to achieve mastery over the enrichment cycle—
from acquisition of yellowcake, gasification/solidification units and 
centrifuges to their operation; and to do the design work and the assembly 
of imported components in Pakistan by Pakistanis with some foreign 
technological assistance by selected foreign personnel from Europe and 
North America.66 
Martin J. Brabers, Khan’s old professor from the University of Leuven, explained 
Khan’s success.  “[I]n buying equipment, he knew all the companies, he knew so many 
people abroad in many countries….  Why, he knew so many languages, and he is so 
charming [that] he managed to buy many things that other Pakistanis would not manage 
to buy.”67 
Khan and his network were working against time.  The export control system was 
initially ignorant of the threat and then lethargic in reacting against it. From the beginning 
of Pakistan’s buying spree, the red flags were raised one by one.  In Switzerland, the 
Pakistani buyers asked specifically for high-vacuum valves for a centrifuge enrichment 
plant.  There was no attempt to hide the intent, but the London Club of nuclear exporters 
had not placed such high-vacuum valves on the “trigger list” of restricted exports, and so 
their sale proceeded.  The gasification and solidification unit—again with a clear nuclear 
intent and again not controlled by the supplier cartel—also left Switzerland, without even 
the requirement of an export permit.  The unit was so large it had to be hauled away in 
three specially chartered C-130 transport planes.  As mentioned above, the Dutch 
government attempted to stop a large order of hardened steel tubes, only to be ignored by 
the Dutch supplying firm.  After the first shipment of British high-frequency inverters, 
Pakistani engineers sent an extended message requesting extensive and complex 
modifications to the finished product.  This sophistication only further undermined 
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Pakistan’s cover story that the inverters were for a textile factory.68  Reflecting back, 
Khan noted the eagerness of European firms to do business with the Pakistani program 
and to respond to its needs: “They literally begged us to buy their equipment.  We bought 
what we considered suitable for our plant and very often asked them to make changes and 
modifications according to our requirements.”69 
Pakistan’s supply of luck was large, but not limitless.  People were starting to 
notice.  As governments were pressed from inside and out to control this trade in nuclear 
sensitive goods, they slowly roused themselves to the task.  A British member of 
parliament, Frann Allaun, raised the issue of inverters in the press and on the floor of 
parliament.  He noted, “These converters are of the same kind, and have the same 
frequency, as those ordered by the British Atomic Energy Authority….  They are 
unsuitable as a control system in a textile factory.”70  The shipment of inverters, however, 
took place after Allaun had first voiced his concern.  The British government could not 
re-examine its export controls in time to stop the shipment.   
But the doors were closing for Pakistani procurement agents.  While British 
inverters were on their way to Pakistan, the U.S. branch of the same company denied the 
sale of similar inverters to a Pakistani buyer.  A Pakistani request to a German firm to 
purchase ten to fifteen tons of uranium yellowcake from South Africa was turned down 
both by Germany and South Africa.  The Dutch government launched an investigation 
into Khan’s employment with FDO and the selling practices of Dutch companies to 
Pakistani buyers.  They recommended strengthening security in nuclear industry, re-
fashioning export controls, and launching a criminal prosecution against Khan.  The 
British, once roused, launched an extensive investigation, and reported their findings to 
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nuclear supplying countries.  The United States re-examined its own export controls and 
also put pressure on other Western countries, as well as applying mild pressure directly 
on Pakistan.71   
The supplier cartels were battling horizontally and vertically.  Bilaterally and 
through multilateral organizations, states slowly harmonized export controls to prevent 
Pakistan and others from seeking and exploiting the weakest national regulations.  
Simultaneously, state regulators had to seek to control further and further down on the 
chain of production.  Initially, Pakistanis were buying entire systems (as in the massive 
Swiss gasification and solidification unit), then they were buying sub-systems, then major 
components, then materials useful in engineering the components themselves.  As the 
U.S. journalists Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney note, “The clever Pakistanis were 
staying a step ahead of the game by buying the individual parts and assembling more and 
more of the equipment themselves in Pakistan itself.”72 
Khan’s procurement network was paying important dividends.  To create the 
internal infrastructure—the roaring cascades of centrifuges gradually enriching the 
uranium gas—this external procurement network was critical.  In the early years, 
Pakistan’s desire for a nuclear weapon as soon as possible was tearing Khan’s cascade of 
whirling centrifuges apart.  Shortcuts, limited diagnostics, and an emphasis on speed over 
precision meant that centrifuges were breaking down.  Within five years, according to 
one Western intelligence official, their first cascades had been devastated from the loss of 
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capacity.73  But the cost had been worth it.  By the mid-1980s, within a decade of Khan 
leaving his URENCO offices for the last time, Pakistan had produced enough highly 
enriched uranium for a weapon.74 
C. IF YOU PLAY IN THE MUD 
In many ways, the story of A. Q. Khan is reminiscent of an “Indiana Jones” 
movie.  Our protagonist is racing down a long corridor, with nonproliferation barriers 
rising in front of him, and he has to quickly navigate these obstacles lest he be crushed.  
After Khan overcomes each hurdle, a new one emerges in front of him that he must 
circumvent to avoid failure.  In a very real sense, Khan was in a race against the most 
powerful governments around the world.  While their resources are massive, their 
bureaucracies were slow to respond to new proliferation practices and had an even more 
difficult time cooperating with one another to stem the rising tide of illicit nuclear 
exports.  Khan stayed one step ahead of the competition for almost three decades. 
To succeed, Khan had to deal with nefarious characters all around the world. He 
gained access to enormous amounts of poorly accounted for money, and gained control 
over contracts worth millions that would not be audited.  Weary that the bureaucratic 
lethargy of PAEC would be replicated, the Pakistani state had given Khan broad 
autonomy to run his research laboratories.  This meant less oversight, and greater 
potential for corruption.  This was a very slippery slope on which Khan traversed.  
Graham Allison, a former Clinton administration defense official, has commented, “You 
don’t find people of integrity who operate in that zone.”75 
In defending KRL, Gen. Aslam Beg inadvertently indicates how an atmosphere of 
impropriety can slowly develop:  
If a scientist is given 10 million dollars to get the equipment how would he 
do it?  He will not carry the money in his bag.  He will put the money in a 
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foreign bank account in someone’s name.  The money lies in the account 
for some time, and the mark-up that fetches may probably have gone into 
his account.  It is a fringe benefit.  It is very logical that somebody 
contacts a scientist telling him that ARY Gold determines gold [prices] in 
the region, so why not invest a million dollars or have it invested on his 
behalf?  This may have happened.  Is it a crime?  No.76 
In this sort of environment, no one raised serious objections when Khan’s former 
son-in-law and Khan’s uncle received profitable contracts to procure materials 
significantly over market rates.77  Or, if objections were raised, Pakistan’s national 
security mangers were quick to silence them, lest Khan’s “legitimate” work be put into 
jeopardy. 
D. AN UNHEALTHY RIVALRY 
Abdul Qadeer Khan is often referred to as the father of the Pakistani nuclear 
weapons program.78  But he is not.  A more accurate, but less grandiose, description 
would be that Khan is the father of the Pakistani uranium enrichment program.  In this 
role, Khan had a crucial but circumscribed mission: to generate sufficient quantities of 
fissile material for a Pakistani nuclear weapons arsenal.  Khan was part of a broader 
Pakistani nuclear weapons effort, where most requirements were tasked to a rival 
organization: the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (see Figure 1, next page). 
Khan continually sought to expand the responsibilities entrusted to his 
laboratories.  As his nuclear transactions demonstrate, Khan apparently gained expertise 
in fields other than uranium enrichment.  He may have achieved competency in designing 
the bomb, developing a trigger mechanism, converting uranium gas into a metal, and 
perhaps work on design assembly itself.79  This expanded workload may have received 
some sanction by the Pakistani state, it may have been developed independently at 
Khan’s own initiative, or it likely was some combination of both.  In any event, by the 
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late 1980s, Khan had knowledge of nuclear activity beyond just uranium enrichment and 
was able to transfer some of that knowledge and technology to other states.  
The rivalry manifested itself in two visible ways: a public relations battle to win 
popular esteem (and discredit the opposing laboratory) and a competition over 
responsibilities and resources between the two organizations.  The public rivalry was 
particularly vicious, with both parties spreading allegations about the patriotism, 
competence, and integrity of the other.  Munir Ahmad Khan did less to harness 
journalists to attack Khan, though PAEC officials did leak concerns about corruption and 
malfeasance at KRL to favored members of the media.80  Both PAEC and KRL officials 
cooperated with media accounts to ensure their achievements would receive favorable 
coverage.  They authored long op-eds describing their achievements in the English-




Figure 1.   PAEC and KRL Areas of Responsibility  
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A. Q. Khan patronized perhaps 20 journalists throughout Pakistan, and had a 
particularly close relationship with his “biographer” Zahid Malik.81  This was part of a 
broader effort by A. Q. Khan to give noticeably to charities and educational institutions, 
perhaps over Rs. 2 billion in total.82  A. Q. Khan at the minimum condoned a smear 
campaign by journalists, like Malik, to discredit Munir and his work.  In Malik’s book, 
there is a chapter entitled, “The Myth of Munir’s Atom Bomb.”83  Elsewhere in the book, 
Malik claims to quote Zulfikar Ali Bhutto calling Munir “a bastard, a traitor, and a 
cheat.”84  Malik also “reports” that Zia-ul-Haq was of a similar opinion about Munir: “He 
is a bastard, a CIA agent.”85  For his trouble, Malik alleges that Munir reported his 
hagiographic effort to the security services, which proceeded to seize the journalist’s 
draft manuscript.86     
This public battle was an extension of a fierce bureaucratic rivalry occurring 
behind the scenes.  The uranium enrichment effort was initially placed within the 
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission hierarchy.  As A. Q. Khan achieved successes in 
his effort to create a gas centrifuge cascade, he asked and received increasing autonomy, 
culminating in the re-naming of Engineering Research Laboratories after Khan in 1981.87  
Even after gaining autonomy as head of Khan Research Laboratories, Khan chafed at 
having to be dependent on PAEC.  He blamed Munir Ahmad Khan, PAEC’s director, for 
shortages and quality control issues with the uranium hexafluoride gas.88  A. Q. Khan 
claimed that PAEC also was lagging behind in its development of the nuclear weapon 
design itself.89   
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As a consequence, according to Pakistani reporter Shahid-ur-Rehman, Khan 
claimed that Zia gave KRL sweeping new responsibilities.  Rehman is the author of one 
of the only book-length examinations of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program, though 
one that suffers from a sensational and hastily crafted style.  On this issue, Rehman’s text 
is packed with allegations, so it is best to quote from it at length: 
According to Dr A Q Khan, sometimes in 1982, President Zia invited him 
to the Presidency and directed in the presence of Lt. General A. Zamin 
Naqvi, Advisor to the President on Nuclear Affairs to start work “all the 
way,” on the manufacture of a nuclear device.  This meant that KRL had 
been commissioned, in addition to uranium enrichment, to design the 
bomb, develop [the] trigger mechanism, convert enriched uranium into 
metal, work on the nitty gritty of the device, and assemble it. 
Dr Khan claimed that he was instructed by President Zia not to mention 
his new responsibilities to any body, “not even to Finance Minister 
Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yakub Khan, and his 
Chief of Staff Lt. General K. M. Arif”.  As regards funds, he was asked to 
make use of his own budget or write directly General Zia. 
PAEC scientists questioned the veracity of Dr Khan’s claim.  However, it 
explained a host of unanswered questions relating to Pakistan’s nuclear 
program, e.g. [the] PAEC complain that Lt. General Zamin Naqvi passed 
on PAEC design of the device to KRL and [a] similar complaint by KRL 
against LT General K M Arif.90 
If Rehman’s account is accurate—or, at a minimum, reports Khan’s statement 
accurately—it highlights several of the themes of this study: the Pakistan nuclear 
weapons program was characterized by an ad hoc division of labor, limited governmental 
oversight, very personalized decision-making, and intense bureaucratic rivalries.  The 
fact that PAEC and KRL scientists were complaining about leaks of senior military 
officials to opposing laboratories is indicative of a command and control system in 
disarray.   
Did Zia really ask Khan not to reveal information to Ghulam Ishaq Khan, 
Sahibzada Yakub Khan, and Lt. Gen. K. M. Arif?  If so, this is particularly significant 
because all three were senior members of a committee charged with planning and 
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oversight of the strategic organizations.91  Zia would be subverting the one nuclear 
oversight body that existed.  Perhaps, Zia was concerned about American intelligence.  
Strict compartmentalization might deny the United States information about the existence 
of Khan’s parallel effort.  One imagines that there were hundreds of instances in the 
history of the Pakistani nuclear program where the competing goals of secrecy and 
oversight were in conflict.  It also seems likely that secrecy won more often than 
oversight.  Another possibility is that Khan did not receive instructions from Zia, but 
claimed a secret instruction to justify unsanctioned expansion into new areas of research 
and development.  That possibility is not comforting either.  The only comforting thought 
is that Rehman made up the entire story or misrepresented it, but the number of details 
(particularly of crucial names) gives the story a ring of authenticity.   
Elsewhere in Rehman’s book, he states, “For reasons of security and some other 
considerations, enriched uranium is now converted into metal by KRL itself.”92  Later in 
the volume, Rehman describes KRL’s competency in slightly more expansive terms than 
just re-conversion into metal: “[At Kahuta], uranium gas is enriched to weapon grade 
level and at a nearby facility converted into metallic cores for uranium devices.”93  
Rehman implies that KRL had gained skills in casting and fabricating cores, as well. 
Rehman’s account is substantiated by information from Iran and Libya that 
indicate that Khan did offer assistance with re-conversion and casting of uranium metal 
and with creating a nuclear weapons device.  At the minimum, we know that Khan had 
access to extensive nuclear design blueprints and instructions, which were transferred to 
Libya and perhaps others.  As is discussed in chapter four, the situation has been 
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Khan’s expertise was restricted to centrifuge enrichment, something that does not appear 
born out by open Pakistani sources or information gathered on the Iranian or Libyan 
programs.94   
E. CONCLUSION 
Khan was able to keep ahead of the global export control regime from the mid-
1970s to the mid-1980s.  His success in nuclear procurement had earned him fame and 
commendation at home.  By the mid-1980s, he had created a network of middlemen, 
financiers, importers, and front companies that would supply his nuclear enterprise.  
Khan’s genius—and his danger—was to turn this organization from importing into 
exporting.  The next three chapters explore Khan’s two decades of nuclear moonlighting 
through case studies of his assistance to Iran, North Korea, and Libya.
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III. THE FIRST TIME IS SPECIAL: KHAN’S ASSISTANCE TO 
IRAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
From 1987 to 1999, the Islamic Republic of Iran received nuclear assistance from 
Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, head of Pakistan’s Khan Research Laboratories.  This assistance 
included designs, components, technical consulting, and uranium shipments.  These 
transfers significantly aided Iran in its efforts to enrich uranium.  If Iran is able to acquire 
sufficient quantities of fissile material, it will have overcome the most difficult challenge 
in constructing a nuclear explosive device.   
The nuclear assistance from Khan to Iran is remarkable because it dramatically 
complicated Pakistan’s threat environment.  Pakistan-Iran relations have been 
periodically turbulent, and growing Indo-Iranian entente is disconcerting to Islamabad.  A 
nuclear Iran is not a comforting thought to Pakistani leaders in Islamabad or Rawalpindi, 
who are preoccupied already with threats on their eastern (India) and northern 
(Afghanistan) borders.  Out of all of Khan’s nuclear transfers, this challenges the nuclear 
optimists most directly.  Kenneth N. Waltz’s argument about good nuclear stewardship is 
premised on a realist faith in the rationality of a state not to diminish its security.  Much 
of Waltz’s analysis is based on an understandable assumption that “[s]tates are not likely 
to run major risks for minor gains.”95  However, Khan’s assistance to Tehran provided 
few if any benefits to Pakistan’s security, while risking a nuclear neighbor on 
Islamabad’s doorstep—not to mention international opprobrium from close friends 
(Saudi Arabia) and allies (the United States).96  
This chapter places Khan’s nuclear assistance to Iran in the context of loose safety 
and security arrangements within the Pakistani nuclear weapons program.  As discussed 
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in the previous chapter, the failure of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission in the 
1970s to secure a plutonium reprocessing plant had been partially blamed on bureaucratic 
red tape and fiscal straight jackets.  Khan Research Laboratories was granted autonomy 
and flexibility, and delivered results that seemingly validated this bureaucratic freedom.  
This autonomy necessarily meant that oversight was diminished, providing Khan with the 
space to conduct his nuclear entrepreneurship.  This chapter also provides evidence that a 
unique constellation of Pakistani policymakers in the late 1980s may have been 
predisposed to permit Khan to provide limited nuclear assistance to Iran.  It argues, 
however, that Khan likely exceeded any policy opening provided by Pakistani authorities.  
It concludes by assessing how significant Pakistani assistance has been in a larger 
potential effort by Iran to acquire nuclear weapons.   
This chapter demonstrates that Khan’s assistance advanced the Iranian nuclear 
program.  This provision of nuclear technology to a potential adversary should cause 
nuclear optimists considerable discomfort.  Their faith is based on a belief that nuclear 
secrets will be held tight and states will do so because of concerns about their own 
security.  The assistance to Iran is evidence that Pakistan was either unable or unwilling 
to prevent such transfers.  In either event, the optimists should worry. 
B. A NUCLEAR OFFER 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Khan had spent the decade since he left the 
Netherlands constructing an impressive nuclear organization for Pakistan.  He developed 
a system to identify, pay for, procure, and ship nuclear-related components, technologies, 
and materials from Europe to Pakistan.  These foreign-acquired items were then 
integrated into an increasingly sophisticated indigenous nuclear infrastructure, supported 
by a growing cadre of nuclear scientists.  Sometime in the mid-to-late 1980s, Khan 
appears to have diverted the flow.  He was still bringing in material and components for 
his nuclear enrichment process, but he seems to have been ordering more than Pakistan 
needed.97  At the same time, Khan Research Laboratories was maturing.  KRL scientists 
published papers starting in 1987 on constructing more difficult centrifuges of maraging 
steel, rather than the earlier aluminum-based designs.  In 1991, KRL scientists published 
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details of how to etch special grooves into the bottom bearing of the centrifuge to 
incorporate lubricants.98  Both trends—over-ordering and technological innovation—left 
Khan with excess inventory.  An anonymous American official marveled at the 
accomplishment: “First, he exploits a fragmented market and develops a quite advanced 
nuclear arsenal.  Then he throws the switch, reverses the flow and figures out how to sell 
the whole kit, right down to the bomb designs, to some of the world’s worst 
governments.”99 
The first country that Khan sold to was Iran.  Reportedly, in 1987, three Iranian 
officials met several members of Khan’s network in Dubai, perhaps including an uncle-
nephew team of Sri Lankan businessmen, Mohamed Farouq and Buhary Syed Ali Tahir, 
and a German engineer named Heinz Mebus.100  Tahir would gain international notoriety 
in 2003 when President George W. Bush called him the Khan network’s chief financial 
officer—though in 1987 he would have been fairly young.101  An Iranian exile group has 
claimed that one of the Iranian representatives was then-Brig. Gen. Mohammad Eslami, 
at the time in charge of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s research center.  If Eslami was 
present, it would indicate that even at this early stage the cooperation was viewed as 
having military utility.102  Khan’s intermediaries apparently presented a one-page  
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handwritten note outlining a five-point, phased nuclear weapons development plan.  
Though this was Khan’s first offer, he apparently hit the ground running.  According to 
the IAEA,  
This document suggests that the offer included the delivery of: a 
disassembled sample machine (including drawings, descriptions, and 
specifications for production); drawings, specifications and calculations 
for a “complete plant”; and materials for 2000 centrifuge machines.  The 
document also reflects an offer to provide auxiliary vacuum and electric 
drive equipment and uranium re-conversion and casting capabilities.103 
Khan apparently also provided Iran with information on circumventing existing 
export controls.  According to one anonymous Pakistani source, “We confided in them 
about the items needed to construct a nuclear bomb, as well as the makes of equipment, 
the names of companies, the countries from which they could be procured and how they 
could be procured.”104  The Iranians may have outsmarted Khan, however.  Using Khan’s 
document as a shopping list, IAEA employees reportedly believe that Iran instead went to 
European, Russian, and Chinese firms to purchase the equipment and technology at lower 
prices.105 Iran’s ability to continue to purchase from Western companies is a key indicator 
that efforts to improve export controls were only partially successful.106   
Even if the Iranians did not purchase Khan’s “package deal,” they apparently did 
buy centrifuges, designs, and centrifuge technology.  Cooperation began in 1987,107 
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though Khan reportedly visited the Bushehr nuclear facility in February 1986.108 At that 
time, in addition to inadvertently providing a shopping list, Khan apparently provided 
Iran with designs for the P-1 aluminum rotor centrifuge and sample components for that 
centrifuge.109  Between 1994 and 1996, Iran received an apparently duplicate set of P-1 
designs along with components for 500 centrifuges.110  It seems that these components 
were from models that Pakistan had used previously to enrich uranium, perhaps 
explaining most—if not all—of the enriched uranium contamination found on Iran 
equipment.111  Iran claimed that it had difficulty setting up the centrifuge cascades, and 
blamed this difficulty on “poor quality components.”112  At least once, in 1997, Khan’s 
network replaced previously supplied bellows because of their inferior performance.113  
Also between 1994 and 1996, Iran received designs for the more advanced P-2 
centrifuge, though Iran claims it did not work on this design until early 2002.114 Though 
the Pakistani P-2 uses maraging steel for the spinning rotors that separate different 
densities of uranium, Iran claims it had difficulty manufacturing those components.  
Instead, Iran attempted to use a “shorter, sub-critical carbon composite rotor.”115  
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Anonymous IAEA officials have been quoted in the press saying they also suspect that 
Iran received a nuclear weapons design from the Khan network.116 
C. A UNIQUE CONSTELLATION OF PERSONALITIES 
Why would A. Q. Khan sell nuclear technology to the western neighbor of 
Pakistan?  The Iranian case appears to be an odd and ambiguous confluence of a 
misguided sense of national interest, an ideological opposition to the Western export 
control regime, and the personal greed of A. Q. Khan and his cronies.  First, Khan may 
have received permission from Pakistan’s national leadership to begin nuclear 
cooperation with Iran.  Once the door for limited nuclear collaboration was open, even a 
crack, Khan may have used such policy approval to barge through it.   
Pakistani journalist Kamran Khan has quoted retired Pakistani scientists saying 
that President and Army chief Zia ul-Haq had opened the door to both peaceful and “non-
peaceful” nuclear cooperation before his death in 1988. One anonymous scientist 
described Zia’s intent as “to play around but not to yield anything substantial at any 
cost.” 117  This seems somewhat dubious given Zia’s pro-Sunni, anti-Shi’a credentials, 
and the general souring of Pakistani-Iranian relations after the Iranian Revolution.   
Khan’s opening to Iran does seem to coincide with the elevation of Mirza Aslam 
Beg to the position of Vice Chief of Army Staff in March of 1987 and his subsequent 
tenure as Army chief from 1988 to 1991.  Beg held peculiar views of a Pakistani-Afghan-
Iranian (and possibly Turkish) alliance that could act in “strategic defiance” of the West.  
Strategic defiance was never a very clear notion, but it seemed to involve “strengthening 
collective defenses of regional Muslim countries” through joint training, defense 
production, and perhaps formal agreements.  In particular, Beg seemed to hold particular 
regard for Iranian thinking on matters of international security.118   
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There are more reasons than just old security views to implicate Beg.  Former 
U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Henry Rowen, has 
claimed that in January 1990 Beg presented Rowen with a very clear threat: “if Pakistan 
was cut off [from U.S. military assistance] it might be forced to share nuclear technology 
with Iran.”119  According to Rowen’s recounting, Beg’s threat did not explicitly mention 
weapons technology, but focused on nuclear technology more generally.   
Robert Oakley, the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan at the time of Beg’s tenure, also 
has implicated Beg.  Steve Coll referenced a 2002 interview with Oakley as the source 
behind Coll’s claim that Beg  
opened discussions in Tehran with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard about 
the possibility of Pakistani nuclear cooperation with Iran.  Beg discussed a 
deal in which Pakistan would trade its bombmaking expertise for Iranian 
oil.  Oakley met with the Pakistani general to explain ‘what a disaster this 
would be, certainly in terms of the relationship with the United States,’ 
and Beg agreed to abandon the Iranian talks.120 
An unnamed “Pakistani investigator” has claimed that Beg was “in the picture” 
regarding Khan’s assistance to Iran, though he most likely did not know how extensive 
such cooperation was.  Pakistani investigators reportedly have found evidence that Khan 
informed Beg of the transfer of outdated equipment to Iran in 1991.121   
More recently, Beg wrote an op-ed in one of Pakistan’s leading English 
newspapers floating the bizarre notion that Pakistan and India should jointly provide 
nuclear weapons to Iran under some sort of custodial arrangement similar to that used 
within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.122 Beg has denied any wrongdoing, but his 
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denials have focused more on the lack of evidence against him than in denying support 
for such a policy.  In fact, he pointedly refused to say that what occurred was illegal.123 
Other Pakistani press accounts have noted the important role of Ghulam Ishaq 
Khan, chairman of Pakistan’s Senate from 1985 to 1988 and president from 1988 to 
1993.  As one anonymous Pakistani official put it, “If A. Q. Khan is the father of 
Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, Ghulam Ishaq Khan was the grandfather.”124  Ghulam Ishaq 
Khan worked closely with A. Q. Khan in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s.125  For 
instance, as finance minister in 1981, Ghulam Ishaq Khan gave tax-free status to the 
BCCI Foundation, the non-profit branch of a particularly complex and corrupt financial 
empire.  In the late 1980s, BCCI returned the favor by funneling $10 million dollars 
worth of grants into the Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute of Engineering Sciences and 
Technology, which at that time was directed by A. Q. Khan and widely considered to be 
a front for Khan Research Laboratories.126   
Finally, at least one press account places blame on the now deceased Maj. Gen. 
Imtiaz Ali for pressuring Khan into supplying enrichment equipment and designs to 
Iran.127  Imtiaz, who is referred to by his first name, was military secretary to Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto’s government when A. Q. Khan returned to Pakistan and had a key role in liaising 
with Khan as he set up Pakistan’s enrichment facility.128  Later, he was military advisor 
to Benazir Bhutto during her first term as civilian prime minister from December 1988 to 
August 1990. 
This unique constellation of political personalities—Beg, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, 
and Imtiaz—all may have been inclined to give Khan permission to proceed with some 
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sort of cooperation with Iran.  While there is no definitive evidence, it seems plausible 
that Zia, perhaps at Beg’s behest, allowed for very limited, non-substantive nuclear 
cooperation with Iran in 1987 or 1988.  It also seems likely that Beg permitted or ordered 
expanded cooperation with Iran, as part of a broader policy of strategic defiance.  Perhaps 
Ghulam Ishaq Khan or Maj. Gen. Imtiaz, having worked intimately with Khan for over a 
decade, did not oppose such cooperation if they even learned about it.  And there is at 
least one press report that Imtiaz actually encouraged such cooperation.   
D. MOTIVATIONS FOR NUCLEAR COOPERATION 
A number of things do not make sense about the cooperation with Iran.  First, 
why was Khan’s opening bid so large—essentially offering the Iranians a “turnkey” 
nuclear program?  It seems unlikely, though not impossible, that even this group of 
policymakers would want a fourth nuclear-armed neighbor on Pakistan’s border.129  If the 
scale of the cooperation was not approved by top officials, then Khan’s nuclear 
moonlighting began almost the moment he had an opportunity to sell.  This may explain 
the second incongruity with the Pakistan-Iran cooperation: its more than a decade-long 
persistence.  Iran admits to meeting thirteen times with “the clandestine supply network” 
between 1994 and 1999.130  Strategic defiance was never a national policy, more of a 
fuzzy idea being hawked by Beg and his close associates.  After Beg, Ghulam Ishaq 
Khan, and Imtiaz left the scene, one would have expected the cooperation to whither 
away.  Instead, starting in 1994, it was reinvigorated, with another set of P-1 designs and 
components as well as designs for the P-2.  This expanded relationship occurred precisely 
as the Pakistani-Iranian relationship was growing more troubled over the conduct of the 
Afghan civil war.131  The persistence of cooperation in spite of changes in Pakistani 
leadership and the broader Iran-Pakistan relationship may indicate that A. Q. Khan was 
the primary motivator behind the assistance to Tehran.   
The 1990s were a tumultuous time for Pakistan as it experimented with varying 
levels of democratic rule.  Khan, an adroit bureaucratic operator, may have been able to 
                                                 
129 At the time, the Soviet Union was in Afghanistan.   
130 “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” November 
29, 2004, 8. 
131 See Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000), 196-206. 
46 
use the in-fighting amongst political leaders to create space in which his burgeoning 
nuclear enterprise could expand and prosper.132  It seems that while the initial opening to 
Iran may have had the approval or acquiescence of a few key policymakers, Khan 
dramatically went beyond his mandate in his cooperation with Iran.   
Khan may have continued his nuclear dealings with Iran for money and, to a 
lesser extent, ideology.  Khan’s “money man,” B. S. A. Tahir has admitted that he was 
paid $3 million worth of United Arab Emirates’ dirhams for two containers of used 
centrifuges, and that he then delivered two briefcases full of the money to A. Q. Khan’s 
guest house in Dubai.133  The international investigations of the Khan network reportedly 
have demonstrated that millions of dollars went from Iran into the bank accounts of 
Pakistani nuclear scientists and that these nuclear scientists, including Khan, held tens of 
millions of dollars of undisclosed assets in Pakistan and abroad.134  Some of these 
investigations are reminiscent of Captain Renault’s shock that gambling is occurring in 
Rick’s Café in “Casablanca.”135  After all, Khan’s lavish home, regular foreign travel, 
and extensive charitable giving were well known around Islamabad.136  However, 
Pakistanis say with some credibility that they expected Khan earned his extra income 
from corruption, and many are still upset that he was not content with skimming from the 
top of KRL’s books and instead supplemented his income with nuclear smuggling that 
damaged Pakistani security.137   
Khan also had lesser ideological motivations.  He was intensely opposed to the 
Western export control regime.  He sought to pierce the “clouds of so-called secrecy” that 
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such a regime sought to create.138  These views appeared to have been amplified as they 
related to Muslim countries.  In a 1995 speech, Khan lamented Western “efforts to curtail 
the development of the Muslim World which the Western powers unjustifiably see as a 
potential threat to their monopoly.  Development made by certain Muslim states in the 
restricted technologies does not trickle down to others because of international pressure 
and lack of coordination and cooperation among the Muslim countries.”139  Khan 
continued by calling for greater collective efforts amongst Muslim countries, and in 
particular for increased joint defense research and development.  Together, Khan’s greed 
and ideological inclinations may have pushed him to assist other countries, with or 
without formal approval from policymakers. 
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF PAKISTANI ASSISTANCE 
Pakistan’s assistance to Iran should not be exaggerated, nor should it be 
understated.  Iran is unlikely to have made as much progress on its centrifuge enrichment 
program as it has without Khan’s assistance.  Three significant bottlenecks remain: (1) 
sufficient quantities of uranium feedstock; (2) engineering challenges of running a large-
scale centrifuge cascade; and (3) the re-conversion and casting from uranium gas to metal 
and the production of a warhead.140  Briefly, there are reasons to suspect that each of the 
bottlenecks will present some difficulties to the Iranians if they are attempting to create a 
nuclear weapon.  In all of these areas, the broader point is the same: Khan’s assistance 
was largely limited to uranium enrichment.  Developing an atomic weapon, however, has 
a number of other steps, many of which were outside of KRL’s mandate.  Significantly, 
however, if Khan transferred a nuclear warhead design to Iran, as he did to Libya, it may 
have diminished potential delays Iran might experience in weaponization.   
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First, Iran’s centrifuges are only useful with sufficient quantities of uranium 
feedstock.  In 1993-1994, the Iranians had contracted with the Chinese to build a facility 
to convert uranium metal into uranium gas (hereafter a UCF, or Uranium Conversion 
Facility) at Esfahan.  Under intense pressure from the United States, however, the 
Chinese began negotiations to pull out from the contract in 1996, and finished their 
negotiated withdrawal from the work in 1998.141  Apparently, the Iranians had obtained 
“extensive UCF design documentation” from the Chinese prior to their pullout, which 
Iran claims to have used in creating a quasi-indigenous UCF.  The IAEA experts that 
examined the facility and the documentation have judged Iranian claims to be credible.142  
Nevertheless, Iran may still face challenges in its uranium conversion efforts.  A recent 
Arms Control Today report quotes an anonymous State Department official describing 
suspicions of Iranian difficulties in the conversion, storage, and handling of the highly 
corrosive uranium hexafluoride gas. In the same report, however, another Western 
diplomatic source argues that any such difficulties could potentially be overcome in 
short-term.143   
A recently leaked IAEA report indicates that Iran has managed to convert 6,800 
kg of uranium hexafluoride, which would be enough for perhaps one nuclear explosive 
device.144  Quantity is not necessarily quality, however.  One anonymous diplomat told 
Reuters, “The [Iranian] UF6 is crap.”  Another was more circumspect, saying, “I wouldn't 
say it's garbage. But the UF6 produced at Isfahan is of such poor quality that if it were 
fed into centrifuges it could damage them.”145 
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Second, even if Iran were able to manufacture sufficient quantities of feedstock, it 
would have to process it through a large cascade of centrifuges running at high speeds 
and efficiencies.  The IAEA has reported that Iran has 1274 assembled rotors at Natanz, 
though David Albright and Corey Hinderstein have estimated that only about 500 of 
these are functional.146  Assuming Iran is able to bring additional rotors online at 70-100 
centrifuges per month, Albright and Hinderstein argue that Iran could have a nuclear 
weapon by early 2007.  They admit that this would be the best-case scenario, and indicate 
that Iran may have difficulty keeping the cascade running.  The anonymous State 
Department official in the Arms Control Today report indicates that Iran may be 
experiencing just such problems.147  A recent U.S. National Intelligence Estimate 
reportedly concluded that Iran was at least ten years from having sufficient fissile 
material for a nuclear weapon, implying that a bottleneck exists in either the uranium 
conversion or enrichment phases, or possibly both.148   
Third, after Iran acquires sufficient quantities of fissile material, it would have to 
convert the enriched uranium gas into metal and manufacture the components for a 
nuclear warhead.  Albright and Hinderstein argue that this process might only take a few 
more months.149  According to press reports on the most recent U.S. government 
estimate, there is no consensus within the intelligence community on when Iran would be 
ready with an implosion device.150  It is possible that Khan provided Iran with blueprints 
of a tested implosion design, as he did with the Libyans.  If so, that could significantly 
ease Iran’s task.  Even if this were the case, it is unclear if such a device would be small 
or light enough to be delivered aboard Iran’s present ballistic missiles.151  While this 
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would certainly reinforce the credibility of an Iranian nuclear deterrent, even a difficult-
to-deliver nuclear device would cause all but the most determined hawks to pause before 
contemplating the use of force against Iran.  
F. CONCLUSION 
Iran appears to represent Khan’s first nuclear sale.  A unique confluence of 
policymakers combined with loose safeguards may have allowed Khan to get his nuclear 
enterprise off of the ground.  His cooperation with Iran continued even after those 
policymakers who might have approved such a venture had left the seen.  His cooperation 
with Iran continued even after Pakistani-Iranian relations had soured in the mid-1990s.  It 
appears that Khan was in control, and continued cooperation largely for his own benefit.   
Kenneth Waltz argued in his support for nuclear optimism, “We do not have to 
wonder whether they will take good care of their weapons.  They have every incentive to 
do so.”  Pakistan had every incentive not to assist Iran with its nuclear program.  It risked 
a direct loss of security, by gaining a nuclear neighbor, and an indirect threat, caused by a 
loss of faith in its nuclear stewardship.  At best, it could hope that Iran would be so 
pleased by the nuclear exchange that the Iranian-Pakistani relationship would be 
transformed into a permanent alliance.  Perhaps, it could hope that the assistance would 
be sufficient to cement friendship, but insufficient to provide Iran with a real nuclear 
weapon.  Risk-taking based on shaky beliefs is not predicted by the optimist argument.   
The optimists’ faith is further shaken if we assume that the state did not authorize 
the transfer.  If rogue actors can make significant decisions with nuclear technology, then 
the faith of optimists that states are sensitive to their own demise instead devolves into a 
faith that individuals will make good choices.  Khan is proof that individuals often take 
decisions that are very dangerous for themselves and others.   
The above narrative also demonstrates that viewing the state as a unitary actor has 
its limits.  Pakistan and other states are characterized by personalized rule.  To argue that 
the Pakistani state approved Khan’s nuclear cooperation with Iran is almost certainly an 
overstatement.  It is possible that the state authorized some very limited cooperation, that 
a small group of like-minded individuals approved broader cooperation, and that Khan 
himself used that policy opening to pursue extensive and lucrative assistance.  Secret 
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decisions made without outside inputs may be dangerously wrong.  In this case, a unique 
constellation of individuals—where some had inclinations to cooperate with Iran, where 
others were predisposed to give Khan autonomy, and where still others were inclined to 
look the other way—may have approved the cooperation tacitly.   
The next case, North Korea, may provide a different story.  Nuclear assistance to 
North Korea occurred in the context of a broader strategic partnership between Islamabad 
and Pyongyang, where sensitive nuclear technology was often shared.  Was Khan’s 
cooperation with North Korea for the benefit of Pakistan, for the benefit of Khan 
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IV. THE PROBLEM OF BACKGROUND NOISE: KHAN’S 
ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter discussed Khan’s first known transfer of nuclear knowledge 
to a non-nuclear weapons state.  Iran had little to offer Pakistan except for political 
support and cash.152  While evidence of tangible political support from Iran is scarce 
(which might indicate a greater degree of involvement by the Pakistani state), there is 
evidence of cash flows from Tehran to Khan and his associates.153  Khan’s next nuclear 
transfer appears to have been to North Korea.  Pyongyang had more to offer Pakistan that 
might be of strategic interest to Islamabad and Rawalpindi.  In particular, North Korea’s 
experience with liquid-fueled missiles and handling plutonium might have been useful to 
the Pakistani state.  This has led to understandable speculation that some sort of nuclear 
barter might have been arranged between Pyongyang and Islamabad, with Khan acting as 
the middleman for the deal.154   
The North Korean case also differs from Iran (the previous chapter) and Libya 
(the next case study) because of the paucity of information about the status of the North 
Korean program.  In the Iranian and Libyan examples, significant data has been made 
available to the public because of IAEA inspections in both countries and the Libyan 
decision to completely, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantle its program.  With regards 
to the North Korean program, the limited information available in open sources has been 
a combination of statements by Pakistani officials regarding the Khan investigation and 
leaks from government officials to the press.   
This chapter has modest objectives in light of the meager data available.  It 
summarizes the publicly available information about what was transferred to North Korea 
                                                 
152 Iran also had oil reserves, of course, though Pakistan has relied historically on Saudi Arabia for its 
energy needs.   
153 For instance, B. S. A. Tahir says that a shipment of centrifuges in the 1994-1995 timeframe to Iran 
was paid for with briefcases of dirhams, the currency of the United Arab Emirates.   
154 For examples, see Daniel A. Pinkston, “When Did WMD Deals between Pyongyang and 
Islamabad Begin,” Research Story of the Week, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for 
International Studies (October 21, 2002), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/021028.htm; and Gaurav Kampani, 
“Second Tier Proliferation: The Case of Pakistan and North Korea,” Nonproliferation Review 9, no. 3 (Fall-
Winter 2002): 107-16.    
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and how significant such transfers might be.  It demonstrates that a nuclear-for-missile 
technology exchange, while possible, is not the only way to read the Pakistani-North 
Korean relationship.  It offers alternative, but unproven, explanations.  It examines the 
prospect that North Korea might have provided plutonium or plutonium expertise to 
Pakistan.  It looks at evidence suggesting Pakistan may have assisted North Korea with 
uranium conversion, suggesting broad state-to-state nuclear cooperation.  It concludes by 
arguing that none of the state-level explanations are entirely compelling, and more weight 
should be given to individual or institutional rationales for Khan’s assistance to 
Pyongyang. 
B. THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF KHAN’S ASSISTANCE 
Pakistani officials have discussed the nature of Khan’s nuclear assistance with 
North Korea, both directly to the press and with U.S. officials.  A. Q. Khan, in a signed 
statement, reportedly accepted responsibility for “supplying old and discarded centrifuge 
and enrichment machines together with sets of drawings, sketches, technical data and 
depleted Hexaflouride (UF6) gas to North Korea.”155  Khan also may have provided 
North Korea with the “shopping list” of all of the equipment necessary to produce the 
machines.156  One can wonder whether it is the same list that Iran used to avoid paying 
the high prices in Khan’s package deal and go directly to the European, Chinese, and 
Russian suppliers.  The timing of the cooperation has been somewhat uncertain.  Third-
hand reports—Khan supposedly told Pakistani investigators who then informed U.S. 
officials who then leaked it to the press—have said that Khan first approached North 
Korea in the late 1980s, but did not begin major shipments until the late 1990s.157  This  
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in Monday issue.)”   




coincides with Pakistani statements that the first “orders were placed for the production 
of components for centrifuge machines” starting in 1997, with the first shipments 
occurring a year later.158 
In September 2005, President Musharraf said that Khan exported “probably a 
dozen” centrifuges to North Korea.  He also claimed there was no evidence that Khan had 
passed “bomb designs to others” besides the Libyans.159  A dozen centrifuges would have 
been insufficient to produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear bomb.  
However, they could be used as a template from which copies could be made.  Musharraf 
also indicated that Khan might have sent uranium hexafluoride to North Korea.160  At the 
same time, the Pakistani president argued that since Khan’s responsibility was uranium 
enrichment he could not have assisted North Korea in overcoming other challenges to the 
bomb.  He said, “Dr. A.Q. Khan's part is only enriching the uranium to weapons grade. 
He does not know about making the bomb, he does not know about the trigger 
mechanism, he does not know about the delivery system.”  If North Korea had developed 
the bomb, they “must have got it themselves or somewhere else—not from Pakistan.”161 
Musharraf’s description of Khan’s capabilities was erroneous.  As noted in 
chapter two, KRL competencies had expanded significantly beyond uranium enrichment, 
though centrifuge enrichment certainly remained its primary mission.  There are 
indications that in the 1980s, Khan also had gained proficiency in developing the trigger 
mechanism, uranium re-conversion, and bomb design and assembly.162  Interestingly, 
Musharraf’s statements to the press may not have been intentionally disingenuous.  It 
seems equally possible that even at this late date there is confusion at the highest levels of 
the government of Pakistan about the activities of the nuclear labs during the 
compartmentalized and covert 1980s.  Khan may have transferred nuclear know-how in 
these other areas to North Korea, though it is also possible that Khan transferred 
                                                 
158 “Re-imposition of sanctions feared,” Dawn, February 5, 2004. 
159 David E. Sanger, “Pakistan Leader Confirms Nuclear Exports,” New York Times, September 13, 
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technology and expertise only relating to his specialty of centrifuge enrichment.  
Musharraf admitted he had no evidence regarding whether Khan transferred the bomb 
designs to North Korea.163 
The U.S. government is concerned that North Korea has gained centrifuge 
technology, providing it with a much less detectible path to fissile material.  Mitchell B. 
Reiss and Robert L. Gallucci, who occupied senior State Department positions in the 
Bush and Clinton administrations respectively, have written that North Korea has 
imported at least some of the components necessary to assemble a large centrifuge 
cascade.  They cite evidence of North Korean efforts to acquire the materials necessary 
for a significant number of centrifuges and uranium hexafluoride feed and withdrawal 
systems.  They refer specifically to an intercepted 22-ton shipment of high-strength 
aluminum tubes destined for North Korea from a German firm.  Ostensibly, these tubes 
were for use in a centrifuge program—though such assumptions have caused problems 
for U.S. intelligence in the past.  Most significantly, they claim not just North Korean 
efforts, but apparent successes in procurement: “In mid-2002, the Bush administration 
obtained clear evidence that North Korea had acquired material and equipment for a 
centrifuge facility that, when complete, could produce enough weapons-grade uranium 
for two or more nuclear weapons per year.”164   
With that said, as Corey Hinderstein of the Institute for Science and International 
Security has noted, intercepting a large number of materials does not necessarily indicate 
a large program, just as intercepting a small number of materials is not necessarily 
evidence of a small program.  Further, procurement success must still be converted into a 
technological capability.165  Such caveats are necessary following erroneous U.S. 
intelligence estimates regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.166  
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Unlike the Iranian case discussed in the previous chapter, Pakistani assistance did 
not overcome a key barrier between North Korea and a nuclear weapon.  Indeed, if North 
Korea has reprocessed its 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods, it would have sufficient fissile 
material for four to six nuclear devices irrespective of what Khan might have provided.167  
Before 1992, North Korea also produced enough plutonium for perhaps two additional 
nuclear devices.168  So, even without a uranium program, North Korea would have the 
potential to produce up to eight nuclear explosive devices, though difficulties in 
reprocessing might decrease the weapons-grade plutonium available for bomb making.  
Under the best-case scenario (for the United States), these reprocessing difficulties could 
mean that North Korea only has sufficient weapons-grade material for 1 or 2 devices.169  
Such a low figure is supported by at least one prominent North Korean defector.170 
Past Pakistani assistance is significant because it increases dramatically the 
challenge of verifying the status of the North Korean nuclear program.  The United States 
and its allies apparently have had great difficulty in locating North Korean nuclear 
facilities, and in particular any centrifuge cascades the North might have assembled.171  
As noted in the introduction of this thesis, the plutonium route required large facilities 
that could be easily observed.  By introducing centrifuge technology onto the Korean 
peninsula, A. Q. Khan’s transfers have improved the ability of North Korea to conceal its 
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nuclear activities.  This fact has complicated greatly the ability of the parties to come to a 
diplomatic and peaceful solution to the North Korean nuclear problem.172 
C. A NUCLEAR BARTER? 
Khan’s transfers appear to have eased North Korea’s nuclear effort.  They have 
impinged upon U.S. national interests in a region of vital concern.  Further, such 
assistance, if revealed, would certainly draw the ire of Japan, a key foreign aid provider 
for Pakistan.  Islamabad faced significant risks if such assistance was discovered.  Why 
did Khan assist a non-Muslim country, thousands of miles away?  Did Pakistan enter into 
a nuclear-for-missile technology barter?  Was their broader nuclear cooperation between 
Islamabad and Pyongyang?  Or was this the case of Khan acting to benefit himself or his 
laboratory?  Simply put, there is not sufficient information to answer any of these 
questions definitively.  The available evidence appears to lean, however, toward Khan 
acting as an individual or as a laboratory head, rather than as an agent of the Pakistani 
government.  The proof of state involvement does not yet outweigh signs that Khan was a 
rogue actor.  This chapter lists potential indicators that would support (or rebut) each 
scenario.  As more evidence is available in the public domain, future analysts may be 
able to draw firmer conclusions about the level of state complicity in transfers to North 
Korea. 
1. A Nuclear-for-Missile Technology Swap 
In the 1980s, Pakistan had secured F-16s from the United States in exchange for 
its cooperation against the Soviets in Afghanistan.  In October 1990, after 40 F-16s were 
delivered, less than half of the total order, U.S. aid to Pakistan was halted out of concern 
over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons efforts.173  The ability of Pakistan to deliver its nuclear 
weapon was called into question.  The task to develop a delivery vehicle was made all the 
more urgent since India had tested the Agni ballistic missile in May 1989.  From the 
highest levels of the Pakistani government, a call was issued for the strategic 
organizations to develop or procure a delivery vehicle.  As with other strategic missions, 
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PAEC and KRL competed to be the first to deliver.  The winner of this technological race 
would benefit from significant public prestige. 
In the missile race, the PAEC sought to continue a historic partnership with the 
Chinese military and scientific establishments.  Some sources suggest that agreement was 
reached between Pakistan and China to cooperate on solid-fueled missiles as early as 
1987.174  If correct, this would indicate Sino-Pakistani cooperation early in the life of the 
M-9 and M-11 programs, before the first Chinese flight test of either missile.175  Gordon 
Oehler, former head of the Director of Central Intelligence’s Center for Weapons 
Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control, testified that Pakistan acquired a 
“training M-11 ballistic missile” in 1990 and received 34 M-11s in November 1992.176  
In the mid-1990s, it appears that China also assisted Pakistan in constructing a facility to 
manufacture M-11 missile components.177  
If Pakistan did receive complete M-11s, it was slow in brandishing them.  Given 
South Asia’s culture of one-upmanship, this is somewhat confusing.  However, fears of 
sanctions—sanctions that might embarrass Beijing—could have delayed Pakistan from 
publicly testing the M-11, or indigenous derivatives.  The M-11 is widely believed to be 
the basis for the Pakistani Hatf-III.178  However, the first reported “Hatf-III” test in July 
1997 is doubly confusing.  While referred to as the Hatf-III in contemporary press 
accounts, those same accounts list it as having a much greater range—800 kilometers—
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than the standard M-11.179  Indian press accounts argue that this missile is an M-9 
derivative.180  More authoritative Pakistani sources, like that of Brigadier Naeem Salik, 
director of Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs for Pakistan’s SPD, do not take note 
of the July 1997 test.181   
It appears that the July 1997 test was not a flight test, but rather a ground-based 
test firing of the engine.182  Non-governmental analysts and the press, however, have 
confused the situation considerably by misinterpreting what was meant by the word 
“test.”183  This timeline is important.  If Pakistan already had conducted a test flight of a 
nuclear-capable, solid-fuel medium-range ballistic missile, why would it be so desperate 
to acquire liquid-fueled North Korean technology?  The point is that Pakistan had not 
successfully flight-tested a solid-fueled alternative when the alleged nuclear assistance to 
North Korea began.  The first “real” Hatf-III flight test occurred on May 26, 2002, in the 
midst of the tense Indo-Pakistani military standoff of 2001-2002.  The Ghaznavi missile, 
as the Hatf-III was called at the time of the test, had an announced maximum range of 
290 kilometers, almost exactly equal to open-source reports of the M-11’s range (300 
kilometers).184  The slightly shorter announced range was likely a modest attempt not to 
flout the Missile Technology Control Regime’s ban on transferring missiles with ranges 
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at or above 300 kilometers.  The M-11, while nuclear-capable in terms of its potential 
payload, is limited as a delivery vehicle by its relatively short range.185  Significantly, it 
cannot deliver a warhead onto New Delhi from Pakistani territory, though its greater 
accuracy improves its utility against closer military targets.186   
Throughout the 1990s, the PAEC was working simultaneously with China on 
longer range, solid-fuel missile technology for Pakistan, perhaps deriving from the M-9 
missile.  The M-9 can hold more distant targets at risk, with a significantly longer range 
of approximately 600 kilometers with a payload of 500 kilograms.187  There remains 
some debate about whether entire M-9s or just M-9 technology was transferred to 
Pakistan.  Machinery for the production of M-9s may also have been received during the 
mid-1990s.188  The July 1997 rocket test was probably for this development program.189  
The first flight test of the Hatf-IV, however, did not occur until April 14, 1999.  The 
Shaheen, the name given to the Hatf-IV, was announced with a range of 600 kilometers 
and a payload of 1,000 kilograms.190 
So PAEC worked throughout the 1990s to acquire a delivery vehicle.  It only was 
able to flight test a credible candidate missile by April 1999.  Khan and KRL beat PAEC 
by more than a year.  On April 6, 1998, the 1500-km range Ghauri-1, a liquid-fueled, 
Nodong-derivative, was flight-tested.  A contemporary Pakistan television broadcast 
captures the mood: “In his message to Dr. A. Q. Khan, Prime Minister Mohammad 
Nawaz Sharif has warmly congratulated Dr. Khan and his team of scientists and 
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engineers, as well as the entire nation on this historic achievement.”191  Looking back, 
Brigadier Naeem Salik of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division discussed the strategic 
significance: “The test firing… was a major breakthrough because this missile… 
provided Pakistan with a real deterrent against India’s growing missile capability.”192  
Khan had won the race, and had won popular acclaim.  Had Khan’s Ghauri been part of a 
broader deal?  Had Pakistan provided North Korea with centrifuge technology in order to 
field a tested missile sooner?   
Pakistani-North Korean cooperation on ballistic missile technology began perhaps 
as early as 1992.193  Benazir Bhutto has admitted publicly that she obtained guarantees of 
missile technology during her December 1993 visit to Pyongyang.  But she has denied 
any missile for nuclear technology swap occurred: “We did not obtain missiles in 
exchange for nuclear technology.  Whatever the technology was, we bought it with 
money,” she said.194  Bhutto is savvy and self-serving politician, whose statements should 
be taken with a grain of salt.  Nevertheless, there is scant evidence to contradict her 
version of events.  One anonymous Bush administration official described the nuclear-
for-missile technology swap as a proliferation “urban legend.”195  In fact, Bhutto’s event 
is somewhat bolstered for her willingness to admit that Pakistan acquired Nodong missile 
technology from North Korea, when officially the Ghauri missile relies only on 
indigenous technology. 
Analysts suspect a swap rather than just Khan’s malfeasance for four reasons, 
none wholly convincing.  First, it is intuitive.  North Korean-Pakistani cooperation on 
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missiles was well known by every key Pakistani policymaker—several of whom traveled 
to Pyongyang to ensure its continuation.  It seems likely, analysts reason, that if nuclear 
cooperation was occurring it would also occur with the approval of the Pakistani civilian 
and military leadership. Second, perhaps Pakistan could not pay outright for the nuclear 
missiles.  Daniel A. Pinkston of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey 
Institute of International Studies suggests that Pakistan’s lack of foreign reserves in 1996 
led to a decision to pay for the delivery of the Nodong missile system.196  Third, Khan 
and his friends have reportedly said that the Pakistan military was aware of the nuclear 
assistance.  Khan has claimed, according to the anonymous “investigators” and “friends 
of Khan” that dot the press reports out of Islamabad, that three different Army chiefs 
were aware of his nuclear deals with Pyongyang: Gen. Abdul Waheed (1994-1996), Gen. 
Jehangir Karamat (1996-1998), and Gen. Pervez Musharraf (1998-present).197   
This is related to the fourth and final rationale: the military has had a dominant 
role in nuclear oversight since Zia ousted Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977.  It seems 
inconceivable that Khan would undertake such a venture without approval from 
authorities.  As Gaurav Kampani, formerly of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 
argues, “[A]lthough the nuclear establishment enjoys a high degree of internal autonomy 
in decisionmaking, that autonomy is not absolute; the nuclear scientists operate within the 
confines of a mandate, which makes them subject to supervision by the national 
command authority.”  Kampani concludes that such rogue action is even more unlikely 
given the stakes involved: “[I]t is difficult to imagine how Dr. A. Q. Khan could have 
made such a momentous decision independently without the benefit of a debate, albeit a 
limited one, at the highest levels of Pakistani government.”198 
It is impossible to say with certainty whether decision-makers in Islamabad and 
Rawalpindi a nuclear-for-missile technology exchange with Pyongyang.  There are five 
reasons to think that they did not.  First, as noted above, Benazir Bhutto has claimed that 
the missile cooperation was based on cash payment, rather than nuclear barter.   
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Second, while it is true that foreign reserves sank to dire levels in 1996, it is a 
long leap to assume that Pakistan could find no other way to finance missile acquisitions 
than by a technology exchange.  It is difficult to quantify what North Korean missile 
technology was transferred to Pakistan.  Joseph Bermudez has referred to an agreement in 
November 1995 “to provide Pakistan with key components from either the No-dong or 
Taep’o-dong programs, about 12-25 No-dong missiles, and at least one [transporter 
erector launcher] TEL or [mobile erector launcher] MEL.”199  Bermudez further asserts 
that “a majority” of the items were delivered by the spring of 1996.200  While estimates of 
the cost of Nodong missiles are not available, the shorter range Hwasong 5 and 6 have 
been estimated to cost around $1.5 to $2 million each, while the longer range Taepodong 
I has been priced at $6 million apiece.201  Assuming, say, a $4 million price tag for each 
Nodong would value the missile transfer at between $48 and $100 million.  To put that 
figure in context, estimates by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute value 
Pakistan’s arms imports in the 1995-1996 timeframe at $819 million.202  The overall 
defense budget in the mid-1990s was around $3 billion annually.203  While purchasing the 
Nodong missiles would have been a non-trivial expenditure for Pakistan, it does not 
appear unachievable given Pakistan’s overall defense spending.   
Third, even if Pakistan’s ability to compensate North Korea was limited 
monetarily, Pakistan did not have to trade the nuclear “crown jewels” for decades-old 
liquid-fuel missiles.  It was not as if Pyongyang was stingy with its missile technology.  
Egypt, Iran, Libya, Syria, and Yemen were able to reach agreement to purchase missiles 
of North Korean origin.204  North Korea apparently offered missile technology to 
Nigeria.205  Joseph Bermudez notes that prior to the nuclear revelations, “the general 
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consensus [was] that North Korea had received a small amount of hard currency, access 
to Pakistani missile technology and a venue to continue flight-testing the No Dong.”206  
This non-monetary compensation of North Korea almost certainly did take place, 
irrespective of whether centrifuge technology was in the mix.  If Pakistan did pay cash, as 
Benazir Bhutto has claimed, and if it provided North Korea with assistance on missile 
technology and flight-testing, why throw centrifuge technology into the mix?   
Fourth, evidence of Pakistani-North Korean transactions are not evidence of 
Pakistani-North Korean nuclear collaboration.  For instance, cargo flights between 
Pyongyang and Rawalpindi are often cited as proof of some sort of conspiracy.207  There 
was broader Pakistani-North Korean cooperation.  In addition to ballistic missiles and 
their components, which alone could explain shipments back and forth, North Korean and 
Pakistani scientists collaborated on other military equipment, including surface-to-air 
missiles and artillery.208  This creates a “signal-to-noise” problem (for both foreign 
intelligence analysts and Pakistani overseers).  The conventional trade could have masked 
nuclear trafficking.  Distinguishing the contents of crates on the tarmac is an unenviable 
task.  For foreign intelligence agencies, only human intelligence assets at the point of 
origin or the destination could report that information.  For Pakistani overseers, they 
would have needed to search cargo bound for North Korea. 
Fifth, and finally, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence did apparently raid a 
North Korea-bound chartered aircraft in 2000 and did not find anything proving Khan’s 
malfeasance.209  The fact there was an unannounced search would seem to indicate that 
Pakistani authorities did not regularly screen such cargo.  Further, a raid seems to be a 
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strange exercise to go through if authorities were well aware of Khan’s cooperation with 
North Korea.  If one were going to have a staged raid to find evidence, it would be best if 
one actually found evidence.   
What indicators might be helpful to prove or disprove whether a missile-for-
nuclear technology swap occurred?  Unfortunately, few if any of the indicators will be 
observable in open sources.  Perhaps only a few if any indicators will be available even 
through classified intelligence sources.  Nevertheless, it is still useful to present the 
potential indicators, if for no other reason than intellectual honesty.   
There may be an observable money trail of the North Korea-Pakistani 
relationship.  It seems likely the money trail would be concealed thoroughly by both 
North Korea and Pakistan through the use of front companies, anonymous bank accounts, 
and other means of deception.  Is there evidence of a significant transfer of currency from 
Pakistan to North Korea?  If so, does such evidence point to a transaction in the ballpark 
of $50 to $100 million, the back-of-the-envelope value of the estimated Nodong transfer.  
If the evidence indicates a much smaller transaction, this could point to the uranium 
barter hypothesis.  Alternatively, is there evidence of a significant transfer of currency 
from North Korea to Khan or his associates?  The more cash flowed into Khan’s personal 
coffers, the less it looks like a government-to-government deal.   
Another set of indicators relates to the Pakistani safety and security procedures.  
Available indications are that Khan and his senior colleagues had broad independence in 
their handling of sensitive nuclear technology and components.  However, if there were 
evidence that cargo shipments in and out of Pakistan were screened thoroughly by the 
military, then military complicity in the nuclear trade would seem more likely.  If there 
were evidence that centrifuges and their components were tightly controlled and 
inventoried, then official involvement would seem probable.   
2. A Uranium-for-Plutonium Technology Swap 
Assuming that Pakistan received liquid-fueled missile technology and provided 
North Korea with cash, a testing site, and indigenous technological expertise, the above 
discussion argued that a centrifuge-for-missile barter does not make sense.  Providing 
centrifuge technology seems gratuitous in such an exchange.  There have been two press 
67 
reports—very few given the number of articles generated by print media globally—that 
have suggested another possibility: Pakistan used plutonium in the May 30, 1998 nuclear 
test device.210  Given limitations in Pakistani plutonium reprocessing capability, one of 
these stories has suggested that perhaps North Korean plutonium was used in the May 30 
test.211  Assistance with plutonium expertise—not to mention the potential physical 
provision of the plutonium for a joint nuclear explosive test—would have been much 
more worthwhile for Pakistan.  It might be worth the risk of getting caught assisting 
Pyongyang.  
The May 30 test was figuratively and physically distinct from the earlier Pakistani 
tests.  The test site was located 60 miles from the May 28 testing site.  It was conducted 
in a vertical rather than a horizontal shaft.  Pakistan claimed a yield of 15-18 kilotons for 
the test, while Western experts estimated a yield of 2-6 kilotons.212  U.S. aircraft 
apparently collected air samples after the May tests and brought them back to U.S. 
laboratories for analysis.  Reportedly, Los Alamos National Laboratory’s analysis 
concluded that the air sample “contained low levels of weapons-grade plutonium.”213  
The sample used by Los Alamos appears to have been lost.  There may also have been 
questions raised about the accuracy of the analysis, including concerns that Los Alamos 
contaminated the air sample.214  A more recent news account has reported that a new 
consensus has emerged that the sample was not contaminated, and probably had its origin 
with the May 30 test, perhaps as a plutonium experiment on the side of a uranium-based 
nuclear explosive device.  Quoting an anonymous senior intelligence official, that 
accounts argues, “[The plutonium] could only have come from one of two places: China 
or North Korea… and it seemed like China had nothing to gain” by providing the 
plutonium to Pakistan.215  The potential North Korean lineage of the plutonium—lineage 
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derived by process of elimination—is sometimes combined with reports of North Korean 
scientists being present at the test cite.216  At least one account, with the typical 
anonymous U.S. and Pakistani official sources, discusses “a 20-member delegation of 
North Korean engineers and scientists whom Khan had invited to witness Pakistan's first 
underground nuclear tests on May 28, 1998.”217 
As the above discussion indicates, the available evidence is very thin and highly 
circumstantial.  After seven years to analyze the data, it seems odd that there would still 
be as much confusion as the articles seem to indicate.  For an open-source analyst, 
however, there are at least three reasons to be suspicious.  First, as was noted earlier, 
there are apparently questions about the air sample and how it was analyzed.  Second, the 
paucity of the stories seems to indicate the lack of consensus on the issue within 
government.  The diversity of opinions in the anonymous quotes in the articles reinforces 
the possibility that there is little certainty about the data.  The 2004 New York Times 
article also reported that then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and then-
Secretary of State Colin Powell “had no recollection of theories of a joint test.”218  Senior 
policymakers would probably have been informed if a joint test were considered a likely 
possibility.  Third, the presence of plutonium by no means indicates the presence of 
North Korean plutonium.  One anonymous analyst quoted in the 2004 New York Times 
article indicated that there was evidence that the plutonium detected in the sample was 
“older than the North Korean program.”219  It is possible that the plutonium was provided 
by China, though providing fissile material would be a risky move on Beijing’s behalf.  
Finally, it is possible that the plutonium was home grown.  Pakistan has a pilot-scale, 
unsafeguarded plutonium reprocessing capability in Rawalpindi, at the Pakistan Institute 
of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH).  The hot cell facility, called New 
Labs, reportedly has a nominal reprocessing capacity of about one kilogram of plutonium 
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per year, though likely with a smaller actual throughput.220  The limiting function, 
however, is probably not reprocessing capability as much as the small quantity of 
unsafeguarded plutonium available to Pakistan in 1998.221  If Pakistan conducted a small-
scale “plutonium experiment” along with the May 30 test, it may have been possible that 
the plutonium was of domestic origin. 
3. Other Possible Nuclear Collaboration 
As the next chapter discusses, Libya received a total of 1.87 tons of uranium 
hexafluoride from the Khan network.  The source of that material is significant.  If it 
came from North Korea, it would imply that the regime in Pyongyang had less than 
stellar nuclear stewardship, something of intense concern to policymakers in Washington 
and Asian capitals as they struggle to deal with the Korean nuclear crisis.  If it came from 
Pakistan, it would imply real difficulties with the ability of Pakistan to protect and 
account for fissile material, something more serious than losing track of used centrifuge 
components.  The origin of the uranium might also point to the scope Pakistani-North 
Korean nuclear cooperation. 
According to press reports, there seems to be consensus that the cask containing 
the uranium—the container itself—originated in Pakistan.222  The debate centers on 
where the cask has been and where the material inside the cask originated.  Apparently, 
U.S. intelligence officials detected plutonium isotopes on the container that were 
indicative of plutonium produced at Yongbyon, North Korea.223  IAEA tests on the same 
container apparently did not yield the same plutonium traces.224  Tests on the uranium 
hexafluoride itself seem to have concluded that the uranium did not originate in Pakistan 
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or other suspect countries.225  However, there is no evidence that North Korea has a 
uranium conversion facility.  In other words, there is no evidence that North Korea could 
create the uranium gas by itself.  One possibility is that North Korea sold the raw material 
to Pakistan, which then converted it and transferred it Libya.226  B.S.A. Tahir told 
Malaysian investigators that uranium hexafluoride was shipped onboard a Pakistani plane 
to Libya in 2001.227   
Here again we are confronted with scant public information, some of it 
contradictory.  If North Korean uranium were converted by Pakistan into uranium 
hexafluoride, it would indicate a broad degree of nuclear cooperation.  While Khan 
Research Laboratories appears to have had capabilities to convert uranium gas into 
uranium metal, there is no evidence that Khan had the expertise and equipment to turn 
yellowcake into uranium tetrafluoride and then onto uranium hexafluoride.  If Khan had 
such a capability, it seems likely he would have offered it to his other clients (Iran and 
Libya) or potential clients (Iraq).  In the public discussions of Khan’s proposed assistance 
to all three countries, there is no evidence that Khan offered assistance with uranium 
conversion.  If Pakistan were assisting North Korea in making uranium hexafluoride, it 
would likely indicate the involvement of the PAEC, the organization responsible for 
Pakistan’s uranium conversion capability.  PAEC involvement would signal broad state-
to-state cooperation on nuclear weapons technology.   
D. INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS 
The previous section explored three potential state-to-state strategic transactions 
with North Korea.  It found none of these scenarios to be definitive or compelling.  
Analysts have been too quick to conclude with certainty that Pakistani leadership 
condoned Khan’s assistance to North Korea.  The missile barter seems like a bad value 
for Pakistan.  The evidence of plutonium during the May 30th nuclear explosive test 
appears to be questionable, and even if there was plutonium it might not have originated 
in North Korea.  Public information about the uranium hexafluoride delivered to Libya is 
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scarce and contradictory.  The previous section also outlined indicators that would point 
toward greater state knowledge and authorization.  If Pakistan paid less than is assumed 
for North Korean missile technology, we should be suspicious.  If there were routine 
searches of KRL shipments leaving the country or if there were tight (non-KRL) controls 
on centrifuges and uranium hexafluoride, it would indicate state complicity.  If North 
Korean plutonium were used in the May 30th test, it would demonstrate much broader 
nuclear cooperation than assumed here.  Finally, if Pakistan was converting North Korean 
uranium yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride, the problem clearly extends beyond KRL 
and into other organs of the Pakistani state.   
Without that evidence, perhaps a more parsimonious explanation is possible.  
Khan had broad autonomy as head of Khan Research Laboratory.  In all likelihood, there 
was poor state control of critical nuclear technologies and components, including 
centrifuges.  Khan could ship things into and out of the country with little oversight, 
particularly before the creation of the Strategic Plans Division in 1999.  In this scenario, 
Khan began to assist North Korea in the late 1990s for personal gain.  His own 
importance was diminishing since PAEC, not KRL, was responsible for weaponizing 
Pakistan’s deterrent.  Khan might have assisted North Korea for personal benefit, solely 
in order to enrich himself and his associates.  Alternatively, Khan might have assisted 
North Korea to speed up deliveries of liquid-fuel missile technology, allowing Khan to 
test the Ghauri a full year before the PAEC could field a solid-fuel alternative. 
E. CONCLUSION: THINKING ABOUT RESPONSIBILITY 
Gaurav Kampani, in his discussion of the Pakistani-North Korean relationship, 
concludes, “[E]ven in the unlikely scenario that Dr. A. Q. Khan made the trade 
independently, it does not absolve the Pakistani state of the responsibility of safeguarding 
its nuclear technology.”228  Kampani is absolutely correct.  This chapter—and this thesis 
more broadly—should not be seen as an apologist tract justifying Khan and his network.  
The Pakistani state should be judged harshly for its recklessness.  Nevertheless, the 
arguments marshaled by those who assume Pakistani state complicity are unimpressive.  
The North Korean case is problematic for analysts on both sides of the argument.  The 
broad cooperation between Pyongyang and Islamabad created significant background 
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noise, which has often been interpreted (somewhat lazily) as if it were automatic proof of 
state knowledge of nuclear cooperation.  This “static” is further complicated by the 
profound lack of information about the North Korean uranium program, let alone Khan’s 
assistance to it.  The next chapter discusses a very different case.  Khan’s assistance to 
Libya occurs in the context of a weak Libyan indigenous nuclear effort, a minor 
relationship between Islamabad and Tripoli, and significant evidence of profit to Khan 
and his associates. 
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V. TRAGIC AMBITION: LIBYA AND NUCLEAR OFF-SHORING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
From 1997 to 2003, A. Q. Khan assisted Libya in a bizarre nuclear effort, which 
Tripoli ultimately traded away for re-integration into the global community.  Libya’s 
decision to completely, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantle its nuclear effort spelled the 
end of Khan’s nuclear enterprise. By pulling on the exposed Libyan thread, the whole 
network came unraveled.  The components, materials, and reams of data turned over by 
Libya would prove indisputably Khan’s involvement in a scheme to create a “turn key” 
nuclear facility.  This audacious plan would import and manufacture all the physical 
capital necessary to make a nuclear bomb and train the technical personnel necessary to 
craft and maintain such an infrastructure.  Khan would be rewarded richly for his daring 
concept.  Libya was willing to pay $100 million for such a capability. 
Khan’s boldness had served him for decades, allowing him to rise to the highest 
levels of society and earning him a cult of personality in Pakistan.  In Greek tragedy, the 
protagonist’s exaggerated self-confidence (hubris) results in retribution, and the 
character’s downfall.  Khan’s Libyan effort was overreaching.  The plan’s ambition was 
necessitated not just by the size of the rewards, but by the erosion of Khan’s position at 
home in Pakistan. 
B. PAKISTAN’S REASSERTION OF CONTROL AT HOME 
After the May 1998 nuclear tests, the Government of Pakistan began to think 
seriously about how to operationalize its nuclear arsenal.  A “bomb in the basement” had 
required impressive scientific and technical efforts, but Pakistan had thought little about 
how to structure a system to command and control an operational nuclear deterrent.  
When Pervez Musharraf was promoted to the rank of general and made chief of army 
staff, he re-organized those portions of the military that had nuclear competency.  He 
ordered the creation of a new Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which became functional in 
1999.   
For the first time, the military had an organization that could develop the 
organizational competency necessary to oversee Pakistan’s sizeable nuclear weapons 
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complex.  For the first time, it had senior military officers whose job it was to control 
strategic organizations, not just support them in an urgent race to the bomb.  With the 
military coup in October 1999, the divided power of the 1990s was replaced by unitary 
rule.  Though this may have been a setback for democracy, it eliminated the multiple 
power centers that Khan had relied upon to maneuver.  By late 1999, lines of nuclear 
control in Pakistan were much clearer.  There was one leader, Musharraf, to whom the 
heads of the strategic organizations reported to directly, and who also had access to a 
growing military bureaucracy whose mission was to implement his nuclear orders.  
Previously, Pakistani leaders had to rely on the strategic organizations for expertise and 
implementation. 
Almost immediately, Khan clashed with SPD over his travels, statements to the 
media, and sales of KRL military equipment to foreign governments without official 
approval.229  Rumors of corruption at KRL, which had been around since the late 1980s, 
grew louder.  By 2000, the National Accountability Bureau, an organization created by 
Musharraf after the coup, had built up a damning 700-page dossier on Khan’s illicit 
wealth, though apparently it was not pursued.230  The Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence 
also was growing more suspicious.  Around this time, the ISI raided an aircraft chartered 
by KRL that was bound for North Korea.  Though the search turned up nothing—
apparently because other senior military officials warned Khan in advance—the search 
was representative that the tide had shifted against Khan.231  Reportedly, the ISI 
expressed further concerns about Khan’s travels and corruption at KRL to Musharraf in 
                                                 
229 Douglas Frantz, “From Patriot to Proliferator,” Los Angeles Times, September 23, 2005; idem, 
“Pakistan’s Role in Scientist’s Nuclear Trafficking Debated,” Los Angeles Times, May 16, 2005. 
230 Ibid. 
231 There is some confusion about the date of the raid.  A Pakistani news report, quoting an unnamed 
official, lists the date as between 1999 and 2001.  “Re-Imposition of Sanctions Feared,” Dawn, February 5, 
2004.  John Lancaster and Kamran Khan quote Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai (who may be the official referenced 
in the Dawn article) saying the raid occurred in 2000. Lancaster and Khan, “Musharraf Named in Nuclear 
Probe,” Washington Post, February 3, 2004.  Paul Watson and Mubashir Zaidi referenced Musharraf in a 
briefing to Pakistani journalists as saying early 2001.  Watson and Zaidi, “Musharraf Pardons Scientist,” 
Los Angeles Times, February 6, 2004.  However, the FBIS translation of the televized portion of the press 
conference includes no discussion of a raid.  See “Text of President Musharraf's News Conference 05 Feb,” 
PTV World (Pakistan), February 5, 2005, FBIS Translated Text SAP20040209000072.  Musharraf appears 
to confirm the 2000 date in an interview with the New York Times.  However, the 2000 date is provided by 
a questioner, and initially Musharraf erroneously tells a story about an event that occurred in 2002 as if it 
had occurred in 2000.  See “Interview with Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, February 15,” transcript 
of interview with New York Times staff, February 15, 2004, available online at 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0402/doc23.htm.  
75 
late 2000 and early 2001.232  The Bush administration had also raised its rhetoric when 
talking to Pakistani officials.  Robert Einhorn, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for 
Nonproliferation, was reported to have told Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, head of Pakistan’s 
SPD, “Either you are not on top of this or you are complicit. Either one is disturbing.”233   
Some combination of these factors—clashes with SPD, reports of corruption, and 
louder concern by the United States—led Musharraf to force Khan’s retirement in March 
2001.  A constellation of state forces was now arrayed against Khan.  Khan had dealt 
with challenges from the PAEC and other “anti-Kahuta elements” for years, but this 
challenge was larger.  If Khan’s nuclear enterprise was to continue it would have to 
function with diminished support from Khan Research Laboratories and would require 
avoiding detection at home.  Khan already had a vast network of international contacts 
upon which he could call.  Perhaps the answer was to shift overseas. 
C. KHAN’S ASSISTANCE TO LIBYA 
Starting in 1997, Khan launched his most ambitious program of cooperation with 
Libya.  Unlike Iran, Iraq, or North Korea, Libya had a limited indigenous nuclear 
infrastructure.  In the early to mid-1980s, Libya had shopped around to European, Soviet, 
and Japanese suppliers for a uranium conversion facility, and eventually received a 
modular pilot-scale facility from a Japanese firm in 1986.  From the late 1970s until the 
mid-1980s, Libya also received nuclear material, including over 2000 metric tons of 
uranium yellowcake and relatively small quantities of uranium hexafluoride, and 
equipment and training from European firms and the Soviet Union. The program lay 
relatively dormant throughout the late 1980s, but in July 1995, according to the IAEA, 
“Libya made the strategic decision to reinvigorate its nuclear activities, including gas 
centrifuge enrichment.”234   
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In 1997, two Libyans met with A. Q. Khan and B. S. A. Tahir in Istanbul, Turkey 
to ask Khan to supply centrifuge units to the Libyan nuclear program.235  Starting that 
year, Libya imported twenty complete L-1 aluminum centrifuges from Khan’s network, 
along with most of the components for an additional 200 L-1 centrifuges.  Significantly, 
the network apparently was unable or unwilling to provide the aluminum rotors and 
magnets necessary for these 200 unassembled units.  At least one of these centrifuges had 
been used previously in Pakistan until 1987.  In 2000, Libya imported two test L-2 
maraging steel centrifuges from Pakistan.  Both of these centrifuges had been used in the 
Pakistani nuclear program, and both were contaminated with highly enriched uranium 
particles.  Libya placed an order for 10,000 additional L-2 centrifuges, with the first 
deliveries of the order arriving in December 2002.236   
As discussed in the previous chapter, Khan’s network apparently also transferred 
a total of 1.87 tons of uranium hexafluoride to Libya.  B. S. A. Tahir told Malaysian 
police that a “certain amount” of uranium hexafluoride was shipped onboard a Pakistani 
plane to Libya in 2001.237  The fact that Khan was able to transfer nearly two tons of 
uranium hexafluoride in 2001—two years after SPD’s creation—would seem to indicate 
there were still serious weaknesses in Pakistan’s material protection, control, and 
accounting (MPC&A) practices—if the uranium came from Pakistan.  If the uranium 
came from North Korea, it would raise questions about the responsible nuclear 
stewardship of the Pyongyang regime. 
The complexity—and audacity—of the Libyan centrifuge order has been captured 
by David Albright, who notes that 10,000 centrifuges with 100 components each, means 
that a supplier network would have to procure or manufacture over a million components 
and ship them all to Libya.238  Some of these components must have been difficult for 
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Khan to procure through his traditional means.  After all, in the Iranian, Iraqi, and North 
Korean cases, Khan had only supplied designs, a few hundred used components, and 
perhaps quantities of uranium hexafluoride.  This was a problem that was literally orders 
of magnitude more difficult.  Khan and Tahir responded by turning the existing front 
companies and procurement vehicles into more robust organizations with a capability to 
train foreign scientists and manufacturer certain products.  Khan’s biggest innovation—
and his downfall—was to establish factories in third-party states and Libya to procure, 
assemble, and manufacture the necessary components and resources.   
Workshops in Turkey served as European mini-hubs, from which Khan’s network 
could procure and supply centrifuge motors, power supplies, and ring magnets from 
partially within the web of pan-European export controls.  Importing subcomponents 
from Europe and elsewhere, these facilities assembled centrifuge motors and frequency 
converters necessary to spin the centrifuge at the high speeds necessary to separate 
different uranium isotopes.239  Interestingly, a shipment of these components was sent 
with false end-user certificates to Dubai, and was placed aboard a German-owned vessel, 
the BBC China, en route to Libya.  As will be discussed below, when loaded onto the 
ship, it joined a larger shipment of centrifuge components from Malaysia that would gain 
notoriety when seized by Western governments in Taranto, Italy in October 2003.  
Highlighting the difficulties of interdiction, authorities removed the shipment from 
Malaysia, while the components from Turkey proceeded to Libya.  Libyan authorities 
were kind enough to hand over the nuclear-related items to international inspectors upon 
their arrival in Tripoli.240  
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In South Africa, Khan’s network was able to draw upon firms and individuals 
with connections to the now-defunct South African nuclear program.  This latent nuclear 
knowledge was retained even after South Africa made a strategic decision to abandon its 
nuclear weapons program in the early 1990s.  Apparently, Gerhard Wisser, a German-
national living in South Africa, stumbled into the Khan network.  He met B. S. A. Tahir 
at a dinner party in Dubai in 1999, who offered Wisser a lucrative commission if he could 
arrange for the manufacture of “certain pipe work systems.”  Wisser had previously done 
work for the South African nuclear program, and also had previously supplied vacuum 
pumps and other equipment to Pakistan in the 1980s.  Wisser contacted an old business 
associate of his, Johan Meyer, who owned a South African engineering firm, Tradefin, 
and had previously worked for the South African nuclear program.  Wisser and Meyer set 
about creating a massive steel system to feed and withdraw uranium hexafluoride gas into 
a centrifuge cascade.  The massive system, referred to as “the beast” by Meyer, would 
have been two-stories in height, and filled eleven 40-foot shipping containers.  The firm 
also attempted and failed to produce maraging steel rotors for the L-2 centrifuge.  They 
received a specialized lathe from Gulf Technical Industries in Dubai in late 2000, but 
were unable to acquire the maraging steel necessary to make the rotors.  As a result, they 
returned the lathe to GTI in December 2001.  The lathe was later discovered in Libya.241   
The most publicized facility, however, was located in Shah Alam, Malaysia.  The 
factory, established in 2001, only employed about thirty people.  The plant was operated 
by Scomi Precision Engineering (SCOPE), a subsidiary of Scomi Group Berhad, a 
Malaysian oil and gas firm.  Scomi claims with some credibility that they were unaware 
they had become part of the nuclear black market.242 Starting in April 2002, Urs Tinner, 
son of a longtime Khan associate Friedrich Tinner, began consulting for SCOPE’s factory 
at Tahir’s request.  Tinner arranged for the importation of lathes as well as cutting, 
turning, and grinding machines.  The company made progress in machining some of the 
components necessary for a centrifuge.  Between December 2002 and August 2003, 14 
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types of components were manufactured and shipped to Dubai.  One should not overstate, 
however, the capabilities of the plant.  After all, only fourteen of the approximately one 
hundred types of components in a centrifuge were manufactured in the plant.  As the 
Malaysian police bluntly state, “As of now, no factory in Malaysia is capable of 
manufacturing a complete centrifuge unit, what more, the construction of hundreds or 
thousands of centrifuges.”243 
There were limits to what the network could acquire abroad.  Khan also decided 
to establish a facility within Libya to manufacture components difficult to procure 
elsewhere, and also to repair centrifuges that were damaged in the development and 
operation of an enrichment plant.244  Two British nationals, Peter Griffin and his son 
Paul, were implicated in the establishment of a workshop, called Project Machine Shop 
1001.  They were accused of purchasing and delivering furnaces and lathes to assist in the 
manufacturing of centrifuge components and arranging training in Europe for Libyan 
personnel.245 
What is disconcerting is that after the interdiction of the BBC China, it became 
apparent that the Khan network had been compromised.  Individuals associated with the 
network began a mad scramble to destroy evidence of wrongdoing, or possibly to sell it 
quickly to other interested customers.  Centrifuge components, precision tools and parts 
for lathes, and perhaps seven valuable maraging steel rotors disappeared in 2003, as the 
network was collapsing.  They may have been sold, or held in reserve for a “rainy day,” 
in the words of IAEA Director-General Mohammad ElBaradei, by members or states 
associated with the network.246 
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While the network of non-state actors is the most analytically interesting portion 
of the Libya story, it may not be the most significant aspect of Khan’s cooperation with 
Libya.  Libya received nuclear-weapons designs from the Khan network—supposedly as 
‘a bonus’—which were transferred inside of an Islamabad dry cleaner bag.247  
Reportedly, Khan delivered the warhead plans to Libya in late 2001 or 2002.248  Many of 
the blueprints, designs, sketches and instructions found in Libya appear to have been 
copies of copies of copies.  If the copies were passed on through middlemen, control of 
the information may have been irrevocably lost.  As one European diplomat told the Los 
Angeles Times, “There is no limitation on a copy machine.”249 
D. MOTIVATIONS FOR ASSISTANCE 
Why Libya?  In the Iran case study, we could point to a doctrine—strategic 
defiance—to which influential policymakers subscribed, which might explain state 
approval for limited cooperation.  In North Korea, there was a multi-year strategic 
relationship on ballistic missile development that could perhaps justify nuclear bartering.  
But in Libya, analysts were able to come up with few reasons the Pakistani state would 
want to assist Tripoli.  People often refer to Libya’s early support of Pakistan’s nuclear 
program as a potential explanation for Pakistani technology transfer.  However, there are 
two reasons this seems implausible.  First, such support occurred in the mid-to-late 
1970s, and beginning repayment in the late 1990s seems somewhat tardy. Second, and 
more importantly, after military dictator Zia ul-Haq hanged deposed Prime Minister 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1979, relations between Libya and Pakistan soured.  Bhutto and 
Libyan President Moammar Gadhafi had formed a close relationship. 
Estimates of Libyan payments to KRL of between $50 and $100 million seem 
insufficient for the risk the Pakistani government would be taking.  In comparison, Saudi 
Arabia reportedly paid $3 billion for between 36 and 40 Chinese CSS-2s.250  If the 
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Pakistani state was trying to supplement its defense and nuclear budget, it was getting 
chump change.  The timeline of transactions only reinforces the point.  Much of the 
cooperation began after 2001.  In other words, collaboration and payments increase after 
9/11, just when huge volumes of U.S. aid began flowing to Pakistan to reward its role in 
the Global War on Terrorism.  It seems unlikely that the leadership in Islamabad and 
Rawalpindi would endanger that new relationship in exchange for a relatively small 
payout from Tripoli.  The timeline is also important because cooperation began 
increasing just after Khan was removed as head of KRL.   
It appears that Khan was primarily motivated by greed, and perhaps to a lesser 
extent out of some misguided desire by Khan for pan-Muslim comity.  His Swiss, South 
African, Turkish, and British partners seem to have been squarely and solely motivated 
by personal greed.  This should make us reflect back, however.  Analysts may push for 
larger, strategic rationales, when instead, micro-level, individual decisions and 
motivations may have decisive strategic effect. 
E. OLD FRIENDS AND NEW CUSTOMERS 
The Libyan episode revealed a nuclear underworld that Khan was able to draw 
upon to launch his ambitious scheme.  What is so disconcerting is that Western 
governments knew of many of these individuals and entities, and their potential illicit 
operations.  National and international regulators had at least a partial picture of many of 
the key nodes in the Khan network by the 1980s.   
Friedrich Tinner, father of Urs Tinner, first came under U.S. Defense Department 
scrutiny in the 1970s while working at a Swiss firm specializing in vacuum technology, 
and throughout the 1980s and 1990s firms connected with Tinner were suspected of illicit 
sales to Iraq.251  Peter Griffin, alleged to have been involved in setting up the Libyan 
workshop to manufacture and repair difficult centrifuge components, was investigated for 
the first time in the 1970s.  Similar tales could be told about others.  Concerns had been 
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raised during the 1980s for three Germans suspected of proliferation activities: Heinz 
Mebus, Otto Heilingbrunner, and Gotthard Lerch.252   
Perhaps the most egregious case involved the Dutch national Hank Selbos.  
Slebos went to school with Khan in the 1960s, first traveled to Pakistan in 1976, was first 
warned about exports to Pakistan in 1980, was first caught with illegal exports in 1983, 
was imprisoned for one year for those illegal exports in 1985, was noticed meeting with 
Khan in the Netherlands in 1988 (Khan was in the Netherlands illegally), continued to 
have difficulties with Dutch regulators for repeated sales to Pakistan in the late 1990s, 
and was a sponsor of a Khan Research Laboratory symposia in 2003.  He has been 
implicated of working with the Turkish and Malaysian firms supplying the Libyan 
program, and apparently met with Libyan officials along with Khan at least once in 
Casablanca in 1998.253  Despite the four-decade-long association between Slebos and 
Khan, Dutch and international authorities were not able to stop the flow of controlled 
technology.  David Albright and Corey Hinderstein have noted, “The failure of these 
NSG [Nuclear Suppliers Group] countries to stop the illicit manufacturing of centrifuge 
components is one of the most embarrassing aspects of this scandal.”254 
Many of these individuals had been involved with the Pakistani program from the 
beginning.  Khan’s effort to craft an elaborate network to procure proscribed items had 
paid an extra dividend.  Khan had simultaneously crafted a network capable of nuclear 
exports, as well as imports.  The same skill set (engineering, manufacturing, logistics, and 
finances) was needed to do both jobs.  And characters willing to assist a rising nuclear 
state for a profit, would likely be willing to assist other motivated buyers achieve their 
objectives.  As the following figure demonstrates, the procurement network created in 
Europe in the 1970s and 1980s became the backbone of the proliferation network of the 
1990s and 2000s (see figure 2, next page). 
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Figure 2.   Individuals Implicated in Khan’s Nuclear Network 
 
F. GOING DOWN WITH THE SHIP: THE BBC CHINA 
By 2000, in the early stages of Khan’s assistance to Libya, the U.S. and British 
intelligence agencies had evidence of shipments of centrifuge technology from Khan’s 
network to Libya.255  By 2002, the British Joint Intelligence Committee had concluded 
that Khan had moved his operations base from Pakistan to Dubai, and also noted the use 
of production facilities in Malaysia.  More importantly, the British had concluded, “A. Q. 
Khan’s network was central to all aspects of the Libyan nuclear weapons program.”256  
At some point, the United States attained evidence that Libya had acquired a nuclear 
weapons design from Khan, apparently through covert operational daring.257   
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U.S. and British intelligence agencies had penetrated the network by this point.  
They were probing, seeking to learn the extent of the enterprise.  In a September 2004 
speech, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet reportedly told an audience, 
“Working with British colleagues, we pieced together his subsidiaries, his clients, his 
front companies, his finances and manufacturing plants.  We were inside his residence, 
inside his facilities, inside his rooms.  We were everywhere these people were.”258  
Khan’s network was not just being bugged, it also had been infiltrated by human spies.259  
There has been some speculation that B. S. A. Tahir might have been a U.S. informant.260   
The British Butler Commission noted the tension between observing and 
disrupting.  “Action to close down the network had until this stage been deferred to allow 
the intelligence agencies to continue their operations to gather further information on the 
full extent of the network. This was important to gain a better understanding of the 
nuclear programs of other countries which Khan was supplying. But Khan’s activities 
had now reached the point where it would be dangerous to allow them to go on.”261  This 
determination to act was made in early 2003.   
A decision was made to interdict the centrifuge and other components coming 
from the Shah Alam facility in Malaysia on their way to Libya.  On October 4, 2004, the 
German-flagged vessel, the BBC China, was diverted to port in Taranto, Italy, in an 
action coordinated by U.S., British, German, and Italian authorities.  Five containers full 
of sensitive components—components that had been tracked from their point of origin by 
U.S. and British intelligence agencies—were off-loaded in Italy.262  As noted earlier in 
this chapter, other containers aboard the BBC China were also full of nuclear-related 
components, this time from Turkish companies, and continued their journey to Tripoli.   
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The U.S. and Britain had been engaged for months in talks with Libya, seeking 
for Tripoli to forgo its weapons of mass destruction programs.  The interdiction of the 
BBC China, combined with other signals from U.S. and British interlocutors, 
demonstrated to the Libyans that their nuclear effort had been compromised considerably.  
Two months after authorities removed the containers from the BBC China, Libya made a 
strategic decision to verifiably, comprehensively, and irreversibly dismantle its weapons 
of mass destruction programs.  In doing so, Libya provided U.S. and international 
investigators with significant new data that could be used to attack Khan’s network.  In 
the words of U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security 
Robert Joseph, “Interdiction of the BBC China, followed by cooperation from the United 
Arab Emirates, South Africa, Malaysia, Turkey and several European countries led to the 
destruction of the Khan network and the on-going investigation, prosecution or 
imprisonment of many of its leading members.”263 
Pulling on the Libyan thread led to Pakistan and Khan, the individual.  In January 
2004, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell called President Pervez Musharraf.  In 
Powell’s words, he told Musharraf, “We know so much about this that we're going to go 
public with it, and within a few weeks, okay? And you need to deal with this before you 
have to deal with it publicly.”264  Khan and his close associates were brought into custody 
by the Pakistan government.   
Dr. A. Q. Khan appeared on television screens across Pakistan on February 4, 
2004.  The tone of his highly choreographed presentation was immediately clear to the 
audience at home and around the world.  “It is with the deepest sense of sorrow, anguish, 
and regret that I have chosen to appear before you in order to atone for some of the 
anguish and pain that has been suffered by the people of Pakistan on account of the 
extremely unfortunate events of the last two months.”265  Khan was pardoned the 
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following day by President Musharraf—a pardon conditional on his continued 
cooperation with the investigation.266  Musharraf’s government placed Khan under virtual 
house arrest.  Khan had reached his denouement. 
G. CONCLUSION 
With Khan’s arrest, confession, and pardon, the A. Q. Khan network ceased 
operations.  In Secretary of State Powell’s words, “All I know is A.Q. Khan is not doing 
what A.Q. Khan was doing last year.  And that is a major, major achievement.”267  
Khan’s network of operatives, middlemen, technicians, and logisticians was thoroughly 
disrupted by the wave of interdictions, investigations, raids, and arrests that became first 
publicly visible when the BBC China was diverted in October 2003.  Many were arrested, 
but some of his associates have almost certainly escaped capture.  Some of Khan’s 
knowledge, expertise, and physical components almost certainly remains available for the 
right price.  Nuclear weapons designs may still be accessible to motivated buyers.  We all 
must live with the legacy of A. Q. Khan.  The next, and concluding, chapter more fully 
considers the implications of the Khan network for how we think about new nuclear 
states and the policies that we fashion to deal with past, present, and future proliferation. 
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From 1976 to 2004, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan was at the center of the global 
nuclear black market.  He was not the first to benefit from the illicit trade in destructive 
technologies, but he accelerated the consolidation of the market.  He did much to spread 
nuclear weapons technology.  He removed key obstacles in Pakistan’s successful quest 
for nuclear weapons.  He provided assistance to Iran, North Korea, and Libya.  
Significantly, he allowed Iran and North Korea to continue their pursuit of nuclear 
ambitions after they encountered dead ends in their attempt to acquire unsafeguarded 
plutonium.  He may have allowed Tehran and Pyongyang to continue with nuclear efforts 
that were not readily visible by Western intelligence agencies.  He offered nuclear 
assistance to Iraq, and perhaps others.   
This conclusion reviews the factual arguments made throughout the thesis.  Next, 
it provides theoretical observations on the importance for the Khan nuclear network for 
the academic debate on nuclear proliferation.  It provides policy implications and 
recommendations for a post-Khan world.  Finally, it concludes by offering indicators that 
might point to the next “A. Q. Khan.” 
B. RESEARCH SUMMARY 
1. What Technology and Material Did Khan Provide to His Clients? 
A. Q. Khan and his network did not have access to the entirety of a nuclear 
weapons program.  Khan did control, however, more components than any non-state 
actor in history.  The list of items available to Khan and his network approaches, but does 
not quite reach, the level of a “turnkey” nuclear program.  He had access to uranium 
hexafluoride, which he provided to Libya and perhaps North Korea.  His specialty was 
centrifuge technology, components, and designs.  He provided used centrifuge parts to 
Iran, North Korea, and Libya.  With regards to Iran, he provided significant quantities of 
disassembled centrifuges.  Often, these sample centrifuges were more useful for the target 
state as a template than as a functioning device.  In addition to the sample machines, 
Khan and his network provided detailed blueprints and designs of centrifuges.  Khan also 
provided valuable information about which components, parts, and materials to purchase 
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in order to create a successful centrifuge program.  This “shopping list” appears to have 
allowed Iran and North Korea to go directly to European and Asian firms to obtain key 
nuclear-related goods, circumventing the global export control regime in the process.  
Significantly, in at least the Libyan case, he provided nuclear weapons designs and 
instructions.  The material Khan provided on nuclear warhead design was not a simple 
blueprint, but a detailed “how to” packet, apparently with descriptions of both 
manufacturing processes as well as design specifications.  Finally, Khan provided 
consulting services, to at least his Iranian and Libyan clients.   
In the Libyan case, the consulting reached profoundly ambitious heights.  Khan 
was at the center of virtually all aspects of the Libyan nuclear program. Khan moved 
beyond just the provision of discarded centrifuges and designs.  Libya did not have the 
nuclear infrastructure to utilize them.  Khan would have to create the infrastructure, both 
in Libya and also in off-shore factories in Turkey, South Africa, Malaysia, and other 
countries.  He appears to have encountered bottlenecks in his scheme.  The numbers of 
ring magnets and centrifuge motors provided to Libya were quite small.  Some aspects of 
nuclear know-how appear quite difficult for non-state (and non-Western) actors to 
manufacture. 
2. How Significant Was Khan’s Assistance? 
Khan was not selling nuclear weapons.  None of his clients have successfully 
constructed highly enriched uranium-based nuclear explosives based on Khan’s 
assistance.  What Khan did was to shorten timelines, perhaps dramatically.  In the Iranian 
and North Korean cases, Khan provided seed technology.  Khan probably could not have 
acquired centrifuge technology for Pakistan without information from URENCO and 
other European firms.  Khan passed that URENCO-based technology onto Tehran, 
Pyongyang, and Tripoli.  These states may have developed centrifuge technology without 
Khan.  After all, Brazil has a centrifuge effort quite distinct from Khan.  Khan almost 
certainly shortened the research and development timelines of his clients: probably by 
years rather than months.  These states did not have to go through the trial-and-error 
process of centrifuge design.  Instead, they had a validated design that they could seek to 
duplicate and manufacture on mass scale. 
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Even successful construction of a centrifuge—or a hundred, or a thousand 
centrifuges—is only one crucial part of the puzzle.  First, uranium hexafluoride must be 
created by the ton.  There is not evidence that Iran, North Korea, or Libya had mastered 
this step, though Iran and Libya had previously acquired non-Khan foreign assistance on 
a uranium conversion facility.  Second, centrifuges must be constructed into a large 
cascade of machines, slowly enriching U-235 from U-238.  These cascades must operate 
for months to create sufficient material for a nuclear device.  Their operation draws huge 
quantities of power from the electric grid.  Flawed centrifuges may break, spinning at 
thousands of rotations per minute, launching shrapnel into the cascade.  Poor quality 
uranium hexafluoride will slow the cascade in its functioning.  The cascade may also be 
discovered by outside groups, as occurred with the nascent Iranian facility at Natanz.  
Finally, once a state has acquired sufficient quantities of fissile material, it must be re-
converted into uranium metal and machined into a nuclear explosive device.  Khan 
apparently provided, or at least offered, both re-conversion and nuclear weapons design 
assistance.  None of his clients appear to have gone this far down the nuclear path. 
3. To What Degree Was Khan a Rogue Actor, or an Agent of the 
Pakistani State? 
One of the most challenging questions has been ascertaining the degree of 
knowledge or complicity of Pakistani leaders in Khan’s nuclear enterprise.  Key leaders, 
most significantly army chief Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, may have been predisposed toward 
nuclear cooperation, particularly with Iran.  These leaders may have provided a policy 
opening for Khan in the late 1980s to begin his profitable nuclear assistance.  This thesis 
has argued, however, that Khan likely exceeded whatever mandate he received from 
Pakistani leadership.  In particular, it is confusing that Khan’s nuclear assistance 
continued after these individuals left the scene.  It is confusing, for instance, that Khan’s 
nuclear trade with Iran was increasing at the same time as Pakistan’s relationship with 
Iran was souring.   
Open closer examination, the “proof” of state authorization for Khan’s assistance 
to North Korea appears much less definitive.  Images of Pakistani C-130s on a North 
Korean runway are insufficient.  The extensive cooperation on conventional and ballistic 
missile technologies created a high “signal-to-noise” problem, for both foreign 
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intelligence analysts and, perhaps, for the Pakistani overseers themselves.  The strategic 
rationales for cooperation are also less convincing when examined in detail.  Why would 
Pakistan be forced to barter sensitive nuclear technologies for decades-old liquid-fuel 
missile technology?  Why just Pakistan, when North Korea was selling the same 
technology to states all around the globe?   
Finally, what strategic rationale justified Khan’s Libyan trade?  If the Pakistani 
state was seeking income, it was selling its services fairly cheaply.  It was also engaged in 
a very risky business.  As Khan’s Libyan sales were increasing, Pakistan was receiving 
massive amounts of aid for its role in the global war on terrorism.  Selling nuclear 
technology to Tripoli could endanger that aid, and the interests of the Pakistani state.  
Khan’s nuclear off-shoring was an attempt to provide Libya with sensitive nuclear 
technology, while simultaneously avoiding strengthening military oversight at home.   
Khan appears to have been motivated by personal profit and pride.  He wanted to 
demonstrate that he could defy the global nonproliferation regime, that he could defy the 
United States, and that he could defy the weak controls at home.  For nearly three 
decades, Khan was a force unto himself.   
The Pakistani state shares significant responsibility in Khan’s nuclear enterprise.  
Its decision in 1976 to provide Khan with broad autonomy and financial control allowed 
for Khan to create his nuclear fiefdom.  The Pakistani state apparently had weak control 
of its centrifuges, centrifuge designs, nuclear weapons designs, and perhaps uranium 
hexafluoride.  Pakistan always felt that this man who had given Pakistan so much would 
not betray Pakistan.  The controls around him were always weaker than the controls 
around anyone else.  The controls on the rival Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission were 
much stricter, and perhaps as a result the PAEC has not been implicated in the nuclear 
black market.268 
C. THEORETICAL OBSERVATIONS 
The A. Q. Khan network provides a wealth of data for the optimism-pessimism 
debate.  The optimist argument was always premised on rationality, the unitary nature of 
                                                 
268 Two retired PAEC scientists do appear to have discussed nuclear weapons technology with al 
Qaeda, in a very serious breach.  However, this appears to be a relatively isolated breakdown in the post-
employment personnel reliability program.   
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a nuclear weapons state, and a relative ease of control of nuclear technology.  The stakes 
were so high, the optimists argued, that reasonable states would expend the necessary 
effort to control their nuclear technology.  The three cases studied in this thesis, however, 
should cause even the most ardent optimist to pause.  In the Iranian case, for instance, 
Khan provided significant nuclear assistance to a neighbor with which Pakistan has had 
troubled relations.  There are two possible ways to read this assistance.  If this was a 
realist attempt to cement an alliance, it appears to have been unsuccessful.  Indo-Iranian 
relations are better than Indo-Pakistani relations.  If Iran does acquire a nuclear device, 
Pakistan will be responsible for its own deterioration in security.  Alternatively, perhaps 
it was Khan acting as an individual for personal profit.  This would call into question the 
optimist argument that states can relatively easily control sensitive nuclear technology 
and will do so because of the potential costs involved.   
As this study of the Khan network indicates, there are limits to how useful “the 
state” is as an analytical concept.  What does it mean that the Pakistani state was aware of 
Khan’s commerce?  In particular, decision-making about the Pakistani nuclear program 
has been highly personalized since its inception.  The Pakistani state, per se, did not make 
nuclear decisions.  Individual Pakistani leaders—Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Mohammad Zia-ul-
Haq, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Mirza Aslam Beg, and Abdul Qadeer Khan—made nuclear 
decisions.  They often made them quietly.  They sometimes circumvented the 
rudimentary oversight bodies that did exist.  More research should be done on decision-
making in such personalized and de-institutionalized environments.  The Khan episode 
sensitizes us to the fact that states are not “ping pong balls” bouncing around in reality.  
The internal workings, down to personality disputes between key individuals, can have 
dramatic impacts on the observed behavior.   
The Khan episode appears to erode the optimist argument in three ways.  First, it 
underlines that states have other motivations besides minimizing nuclear risks.  A state 
will often have to balance very concrete security concerns against hypothetical nuclear 
safety.  This is particularly true in the early years of a nuclear program.  The program was 
likely initiated as the result of a fairly intense security threat—if not, the need to internal 
balance would not have been felt in the first place.  Simultaneously, the state will 
probably want to keep information about the nuclear weapons program very tightly held 
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and compartmentalized, to prevent secret information from reaching the adversary and 
other interested outsiders.  Secrecy and speed are in conflict with safety.  National 
security managers, particularly in the early years of the program, are likely to have 
significant experience with cultures of secrecy and cultures of results, but may have much 
less experience with cultures of safety.   
The second challenge to the optimist argument has to do with the ease of control.  
Optimists had argued that the state security apparatus could easily control the relatively 
small weapons programs of new nuclear states.  But how does a state establish a 
personnel reliability program when it never has had one in the past?  How does a state 
police its nuclear establishment when the program is so sensitive that perhaps the regular 
intelligence agencies cannot be entrusted with program details?  How does it establish 
export controls, particularly when the scientific competency resides in the scientific 
organizations that need to be regulated?  Pakistan confronted these challenges and it 
made several mistakes.  Khan and his top associates at the laboratory were not screened 
by security services.  Khan’s travels were not closely scrutinized.  Shipments into and out 
of the country appear not to have been searched.  Key security personnel at Khan 
Research Laboratory reported to Khan directly, and their financial well being depended 
on Khan’s approval.  
The third challenge is largely theoretical at this point.  Khan’s network lowered 
the barriers to entry into the nuclear business.  He cut years of the research and 
development timetables of his client states.  Libya would not have had a nuclear weapons 
program without Khan’s assistance—he was involved in all key aspects of the effort.  He 
enabled a state with limited infrastructure and scientific expertise to become a nuclear 
aspirant.  The optimist argument argues that the barriers to entry of nuclear acquisition 
will screen out the least stable states.  While the obstacles to nuclear possession are still 
quite high, as they are lowered, the self-selection optimist argument will be weakened. 
D. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This study has highlighted a number of policy challenges that will confront 
decision-makers for some time.  First, the technological piece of the nonproliferation 
puzzle is growing more complicated.  Precision manufacturing capabilities are available 
in more and more countries.  Information about controlled technologies is also more 
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widely available.  Globalization eases travel and commerce.  Specialists from the 
developed world can travel to the developing world with blueprints on a hard disk.  They 
might program a lathe for a few days, and then return home to their cottage for the 
weekend.  A firm in Malaysia could and did manufacture parts for a subsidiary in Dubai 
that turned out to be controlled centrifuge components.  The subsidiary in Dubai did not 
know the ultimate consumer for the products, only a front company.  The shipping firm 
carrying the parts from Dubai to Tripoli did not realize it had sensitive cargo.  The 
intelligence agencies that pulled the containers off of the ship did not realize that there 
were other containers on the same ship, carrying sensitive components from a Turkish 
company that were also destined for the same Libyan bomb program. 
Globalization and technological diffusion have complicated the problem, but the 
old problem did not go away.  European firms and some of the same individuals are still 
selling proscribed technologies to nuclear programs.  This is partially because of 
increased sophistication by client states—using front companies, false end-user 
certificates, and other deception techniques.  It is partially because of the lethargy of 
bureaucracies and the problem of out-of-date export control lists.  And it is also partially 
caused by the high profits that can be made in selling controlled technologies.   
Governments that learn of illicit procurement are confronted with a policy 
challenge: do they watch or do they act?  There is a tension between action and 
observation.  In other words, policymakers aware of the transfer of WMD technology, 
expertise, or material have the choice of watching that transfer to gain a better 
understanding of both the suppliers and consumers, or they can move to prevent or 
interdict the transaction.  The principle challenge is that premature action is unlikely to 
have decisive effect on either a proliferation network or a procurement effort.  Greater 
understanding of the structure of a network—achievable only through watching—is often 
necessary to impair its function. Of course, waiting too long could allow a potential threat 
to mature, risking the security of the United States and other countries. 
Taking action is also challenging.  Intelligence that is collected about an 
unscrupulous merchant, for instance, has to be converted into something usable.  If the 
merchant is in the United States, the intelligence might have to meet legal standards, or 
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lead to other evidence that does meet such standards.  This might delay action for 
months.  If the merchant operates in a foreign country, the problem is complicated 
further. Will sharing intelligence with a foreign government endanger the source?  Will 
that government take action?  Will that government value its own commercial interests 
over a hypothetical risk, particularly a risk that is likely to be more acutely felt by the 
United States than the foreign government? 
This thesis wrestled with Pakistani state complicity because it has significant 
policy implications.  Some policymakers intuitively divide the world into good and bad 
states.  Good states do good things and bad states to bad things.  Many analysts look at 
Pakistan as an archetypical “bad state,” admittedly one that gets away with it.  The policy 
recommendations that flow from that conclusion are about changing the nature of the 
state.  They might be punitive, hoping to the raise the costs of bad behavior.  For 
instance, many believe Pakistan should be sanctioned for its proliferation record, 
particularly if access to A. Q. Khan is not provided to U.S. investigators.  Alternative 
policy proposals might seek to reform Pakistan, hoping to change the nature of the state 
from the inside.  Most Indians and many others believe that Pakistani behavior will not 
conform to global norms so long as the military dominates Pakistani politics.  These same 
analysts blame the military for Pakistan’s dismal proliferation record. 
This thesis has presented evidence of a less Manichean world.  If Khan’s network 
flourished because of failures of Pakistani command and control, the policy solutions are 
very different.  Policymakers must look more closely at assisting new nuclear states with 
their safety and security arrangements.  This will be tricky.  New nuclear states, who 
prize secrecy so much, are unlikely to share extensive data with outsiders, particularly 
outsiders who might be direct threats to new nuclear programs.  Assistance with 
personnel reliability programs may provide new nuclear states with greater certainty 
about their positive and negative control.  Hypothetically, such confidence might lead 
states to deploy their nuclear forces at a higher state of readiness.  Given the significant 
other costs of such deployment, however, it seems unlikely that concerns about personnel 
are the only obstacle to deployed and ready nuclear arsenals.  This potential risk must be 
weighed against the proven risk of what insiders can do when they operate outside of 
state oversight and control. 
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E. CONCLUSION: THE NEXT A. Q. KHAN? 
The A. Q. Khan affair was a significant failure for all involved.  The Pakistan 
government provided Khan too much authority, it had minimal nuclear oversight, and 
was slow to react to internal and external warnings that Khan was up to no good.  The 
United States was too slow in realizing Khan’s growing danger, despite having 
intimations of his nuclear trade by the early 1990s.  Europe was too slow in policing its 
own individuals and firms, which supplied Khan from 1976 until 2004.  There is enough 
blame to go around.  By outlining those mistakes, and examining the causes of those 
failures, I hope that they will not be repeated.  The problem is not going away, however.  
If anything, globalization and the diffusion of WMD-relevant technology have only 
complicated the policy problem.  Each new WMD program could hold another potential 
A. Q. Khan.   
What indicators or characteristics should concern policymakers and intelligence 
analysts in the future?  Khan had broad financial autonomy.  He had great flexibility in 
how he operated his procurement network.  He could acquire and ship components with 
little external oversight.  He had good connections with foreign suppliers.  He was not 
personally screened by intelligence services, nor were his close associates.  He was a 
proud and greedy man.  His wealth was well known, despite his relatively modest 
government salary.  He had strong rivalries with other program mangers.  He jockeyed 
with them for public esteem, esteem which he coveted deeply.  The public esteem also 
insulated him from political pressure and oversight.  His independence was reinforced 
further by the turbulent nature of Pakistani politics, particularly during the troubled 
1990s.  Finally, he was deeply proud of being able to defy the discriminatory and 
Western-led export control regime.  Do these conditions apply elsewhere?  If so, the next 
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